A “margin squeeze” is an exclusionary abuse of dominance that arises when a vertically-integrated monopolist sells an upstream bottleneck input to rival firms that also compete in a downstream market with the monopolist in the provision of a downstream product. A margin squeeze is said to arise when the margin between the price at which the monopolist sells the downstream product and the price at which the monopolist sells the upstream bottleneck product to its rivals is “too small” to allow an efficient downstream rival to effectively compete or survive. In order for a margin squeeze case to arise, three elements must be present. First, an upstream firm must produce an essential or bottleneck input with no substitutes and no scope for other firms to provide the essential input themselves. Second, that firm must sell that essential input to one or more downstream firms which seek to use that input in the provision of some downstream product or service. Third, the upstream firm must itself use its own input to compete against those downstream firms in the market for that downstream product or service. A margin squeeze is said to arise when the margin between the price at which the integrated firm sells the downstream product and the price at which it sells the essential input to rivals is too small to allow downstream rivals to survive or effectively compete, to the detriment of downstream consumers. The primary antitrust concern is that a firm engaging in a margin squeeze may limit, restrict or prevent the development of competition in the downstream market. Depending on the circumstances this may raise the price or reduce the quality or variety of products available to downstream customers. It may also undermine the success of reforms aimed at promoting competition in the downstream market. Margin squeeze cases often arise in newly liberalised industries where incumbent firms have a regulatory obligation to provide certain essential inputs to downstream rivals – particular telecommunications, but also in the water sector, railways, postal services, pharmaceuticals, pay television, gasoline, and funeral services (amongst others). In almost all cases, margin squeeze cases fall under the general prohibition of abuse of dominance provisions in national competition laws. © OECD
Margin squeeze
a
Absolute territorial protection
•
Abuse of dominant position
•
Abuse of economic dependence
•
Access to essential facility
•
Access to information
•
Access to the file
•
Actual competitor
•
Administered prices
•
Advocacy
•
Agency agreement
•
Agent
•
Agreement (notion)
•
Amicus curiae
•
Ancillary restraints
•
Annulment
•
Anticompetitive object or effect
•
Anticompetitive practices
•
Antitrust
•
Applicable law
•
Arbitration
•
Article 11 letter
•
Automotive distribution
b
c
Cartel
•
Clearance phase I (merger)
•
Clearance phase II (merger)
•
Collecting society
•
Collective dominance
•
Collective redress (class action)
•
Collusion
•
Comity
•
Commission Notice
•
Competence
•
Competition policy
•
Complaint
•
Compliance programme
•
Compulsory license
•
Concentration indexes
•
Concerted practices
•
Concession
•
Concurrent jurisdiction
•
Consortium
•
Consumers protection
•
Consumers’ associations
•
Control (change)
•
Control (notion)
•
Cooperation Agreement
•
Cooperation between competition authorities
•
Coordinated effects
•
Copyright
•
Corporate group
•
Corruption
•
Cost-based access
•
Cournot (Nash) equilibrium
•
Criminal sanctions
•
Cross subsidisation
d
e
ECHR
•
Economic analysis
•
Economic efficiency
•
Economies of scale
•
Economies of scope
•
Effect on trade between Member States
•
Effective judicial protection
•
EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) & Court
•
Environmental protection
•
Error costs
•
Essential facility
•
European Competition Network (ECN)
•
Ex Ante / Ex Post Control
•
Excessive prices
•
Exchanges of information
•
Exclusionary practice
•
Exclusive distribution
•
Exclusive purchasing
•
Exclusive right (Art. 106 TFEU)
•
Exclusivity clause
•
Exhaustion
•
Extra-territoriality
f
i
k
l
m
Mandatary (distribution)
•
Margin squeeze
•
Marginal costs
•
Market economy investor
•
Market of goods or services
•
Market power
•
Market share
•
Media pluralism
•
Merger (notion)
•
Merger (prohibition)
•
Merger (withdrawal)
•
Merger control procedure
•
Merger remedies
•
Minority shareholdings
•
Misinformation
•
Monopoly
p
Parallel imports (parallel trade)
•
Passing-on
•
Passive sales
•
Patents
•
Pay-for-delay
•
Periodic penalty payment
•
Personal data
•
Potential competition
•
Predatory pricing
•
Preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFUE)
•
Price discrimination
•
Price leadership
•
Price signalling
•
Price-fixing agreement
•
Prices
•
Principle of effectiveness
•
Principle of equal treatment
•
Principle of equivalence
•
Principle of proportionality
•
Private enforcement
•
Privatization
•
Procedural autonomy
•
Professional association
•
Public procurement
•
Public undertaking
r
R&D agreement
•
Referral (merger)
•
Refusal to deal
•
Regulated prices
•
Regulation
•
Relevant market
•
Remedies (antitrust)
•
Request for information
•
Resale below cost
•
Resale price maintenance (RPM)
•
Restriction on exportation
•
Right against self-incrimination
•
Rights of defence
•
Rule of reason
s
Sector inquiry
•
Selective distribution
•
Self-Preference
•
Services of general economic interest
•
Single branding
•
Sole control
•
Spill-over effects
•
Standard-Essential Patent (SEP)
•
State action defense
•
State aid (compatibility)
•
State aid (existing aid)
•
State aid (notification)
•
State aid (notion)
•
State aid (recovery)
•
State aid (tax ruling)
•
State aid (unlawful aid)
•
State measure
•
Statement of objections (SO)
•
Substitutability
•
Sudden break of established business relationships