Exclusive contracts can benefit competition in the market by ensuring supply sources or sales outlets, reducing contracting costs, or creating dealer loyalty (...) exclusive contracts between manufacturers and suppliers, or between manufacturers and dealers, are generally lawful because they improve competition among the brands of different manufacturers (interbrand competition). However, when the firm using exclusive contracts is a monopolist, the focus shifts to whether those contracts impede efforts of new firms to break into the market or of smaller existing firms to expand their presence. The monopolist might try to impede the entry or expansion of new competitors because that competition would erode its market position. The antitrust laws condemn certain actions of a monopolist that keep rivals out of the market or prevent new products from reaching consumers. The potential for harm to competition from exclusive contracts increases with: (1) the length of the contract term; (2) the more outlets or sources covered; and (3) the fewer alternative outlets or sources not covered. Exclusive supply contracts prevent a supplier from selling inputs to another buyer. If one buyer has a monopoly position and obtains exclusive supply contracts so that a newcomer may not be able to gain the inputs it needs to compete with the monopolist, the contracts can be seen as an exclusionary tactic in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. For example, the FTC stopped a large drug maker from enforcing 10-year exclusive supply agreements for an essential ingredient to make its medicines in return for which the suppliers would have received a percentage of profits from the drug. The FTC found that the drug maker used the exclusive supply agreements to keep other drug makers from the market by controlling access to the essential ingredient. The drug maker was then able to raise prices for its medicine by more than 3000 percent. (...) © FTC
Exclusivity clause
a
Absolute territorial protection
•
Abuse of dominant position
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Abuse of economic dependence
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Access to essential facility
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Access to information
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Access to the file
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Actual competitor
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Administered prices
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Advocacy
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Agency agreement
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Agent
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Agreement (notion)
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Amicus curiae
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Ancillary restraints
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Annulment
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Anticompetitive object or effect
•
Anticompetitive practices
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Antitrust
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Applicable law
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Arbitration
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Article 11 letter
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Automotive distribution
b
c
Cartel
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Clearance phase I (merger)
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Clearance phase II (merger)
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Collecting society
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Collective dominance
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Collective redress (class action)
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Collusion
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Comity
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Commission Notice
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Competence
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Competition policy
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Complaint
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Compliance programme
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Compulsory license
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Concentration indexes
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Concerted practices
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Concession
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Concurrent jurisdiction
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Consortium
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Consumers protection
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Consumers’ associations
•
Control (change)
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Control (notion)
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Cooperation Agreement
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Cooperation between competition authorities
•
Coordinated effects
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Copyright
•
Corporate group
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Corruption
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Cost-based access
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Cournot (Nash) equilibrium
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Criminal sanctions
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Cross subsidisation
d
e
ECHR
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Economic analysis
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Economic efficiency
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Economies of scale
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Economies of scope
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Effect on trade between Member States
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Effective judicial protection
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EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) & Court
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Environmental protection
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Error costs
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Essential facility
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European Competition Network (ECN)
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Ex Ante / Ex Post Control
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Excessive prices
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Exchanges of information
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Exclusionary practice
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Exclusive distribution
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Exclusive purchasing
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Exclusive right (Art. 106 TFEU)
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Exclusivity clause
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Exhaustion
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Extra-territoriality
f
i
k
l
m
Mandatary (distribution)
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Margin squeeze
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Marginal costs
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Market economy investor
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Market of goods or services
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Market power
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Market share
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Media pluralism
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Merger (notion)
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Merger (prohibition)
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Merger (withdrawal)
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Merger control procedure
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Merger remedies
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Minority shareholdings
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Misinformation
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Monopoly
p
Parallel imports (parallel trade)
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Passing-on
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Passive sales
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Patents
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Pay-for-delay
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Periodic penalty payment
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Personal data
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Potential competition
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Predatory pricing
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Preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFUE)
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Price discrimination
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Price leadership
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Price signalling
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Price-fixing agreement
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Prices
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Principle of effectiveness
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Principle of equal treatment
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Principle of equivalence
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Principle of proportionality
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Private enforcement
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Privatization
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Procedural autonomy
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Professional association
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Public procurement
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Public undertaking
r
R&D agreement
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Referral (merger)
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Refusal to deal
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Regulated prices
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Regulation
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Relevant market
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Remedies (antitrust)
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Request for information
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Resale below cost
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Resale price maintenance (RPM)
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Restriction on exportation
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Right against self-incrimination
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Rights of defence
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Rule of reason
s
Sector inquiry
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Selective distribution
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Self-Preference
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Services of general economic interest
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Single branding
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Sole control
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Spill-over effects
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Standard-Essential Patent (SEP)
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State action defense
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State aid (compatibility)
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State aid (existing aid)
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State aid (notification)
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State aid (notion)
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State aid (recovery)
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State aid (tax ruling)
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State aid (unlawful aid)
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State measure
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Statement of objections (SO)
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Substitutability
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Sudden break of established business relationships