of the European Union, Court of Justice

Collective dominance

Institution Definition

"(...) The decision then goes on to examine the existence of a ’collective dominant position’. It states that ’FP, SIV and VP, as participants in a tight oligopoly, enjoy a degree of independence from competitive pressures that enables them to impede the maintenance of effective competition, notably by not having to take account of the behaviour of the other market participants’ (point 78)." SIV v COMMISSION Judgement of the Court (First Chamber)10 March 1992

Articles

Catherine Prieto Richard Whish QC (Hon) Liber Amicorum: Taking competition law outside the box, Nicolas CHARBIT and Sonia AHMAD (dir.), foreword by Wouter WILS

May 2020

This section selects books on themes related to competition laws and economics. This compilation does not attempt to be exhaustive but rather a survey of themes important in the area. The survey usually covers publication over the last three months after publication of the latest issue of (...)

Stéphane Rodrigues Droit matériel européen des abus de position dominante: Textes et commentaires, Luc DESAUNETTES-BARBERO and Étienne THOMAS

February 2020

This section selects books on themes related to competition laws and economics. This compilation does not attempt to be exhaustive but rather a survey of themes important in the area. The survey usually covers publication over the last three months after publication of the latest issue of (...)

Catherine Prieto Market Power in EU Antitrust Law

December 2012

The notion of market power is central to antitrust law. Under EU law, antitrust rules refer to appreciable restrictions of competition (Article 101 (1) TFEU, ex Article 81(1) TEC), the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the market (Article 101 (3) TFEU, ex Article (81(3) TEC), (...)

Éric Avenel, Gildas de Muizon, Nathalie Daley Collective dominant position: Overcoming the Airtours criteria in the ex post control of anti-competitive practices

December 2011

The Airtours criteria do not allow establishing ex post the existence of a collective dominant position as they are used to identify market situations where there is a risk that a collective dominant position emerges in the future. In an ex post intervention, it is necessary to demonstrate that (...)

Anne Perrot, Jeanne Lubek, Olivier d’Ormesson Collective dominant position: Economic and legal points of view

September 2011

This set of three papers is derived from the training session organised by Concurrences Review that has held on 14th June 2011 in Paris. The first contribution written by Anne Perrot, is dedicated to the definition of the fundamental notions. In the second contribution, Jeanne Lubeck explains (...)

Christian Guénod, Malik Idri Tacit collusion theory in the context of sectoral regulations

December 2010

The abuse of a collective dominant position and the underlying theory of tacit collusion have remained of a delicate use despite some clarifications from the General Court of the European Union. This paper discusses the three criteria defined in the Airtours decision of 2002, their general (...)

Stéphane Rodrigues Economics and the Enforcement of European Competition Law

December 2009

Recent years have seen a trend toward an ‘economics-based’ approach to the enforcement of European competition law. But what is meant by ‘economics-based’, and how does this approach sit with legal and enforcement practice? This book seeks to place in perspective the growing use of economics in (...)

Anne-Sophie Choné-Grimaldi Rapport annuel pour l’année 2007

December 2008

The Competition Council published its annual report for 2007 in July. The Council welcomes, as in previous years, the decline in the volume of its stock of pending cases. The number of referrals remained stable in 2007 and the number of cases dealt with increased. The development of its (...)

Jérôme Gstalter Oligopoles, collusion tacite et droit communautaire de la concurrence

May 2008

50 years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, Community competition law seems to have found the "parry" to conscious parallelisms of oligopolistic behaviour. By preventing the emergence of narrow oligopolies through the application of the ex ante system for controlling (...)

David Spector Collective dominant position : about the proper implementation of the Airtours test

February 2007

The Airtours test, used in order to determine whether a merger is likely to create or strengthen a collective dominant position, must be applied with caution. Mechanically checking each of the three criteria laid out by the Tribunal, one by one, would be misguided. On the contrary, a global (...)

Alain Ronzano, Christelle Adjémian, Umberto Berkani Competition journals: April - June 2005

September 2005

1 GENERALITIES - SCOPE OF APPLICATION Chronique Concurrence, Mise en œuvre des articles 81 et 82 CE (1er avril 2003 - 30 septembre 2004), J.-B. BLAISE and L. IDOT (RTD eur. 2005, p. 131) In the second part of their column, this time devoted to the implementation of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC (...)

A B C D E F G H I J L M N O P R S T U V

A

Absolute territorial protection • Abuse of dominant position • Abuse of economic dependence • Access to essential facility • Access to information • Access to the file • Advocacy • Agency agreement • Agent • Agreement (notion) • Amicus curiae • Ancillary restraints • Annulment • Anticompetitive objet or effect • Anticompetitive practices • Antitrust • Applicable law • Arbitration • Article 11 letter • Automotive distribution

B

Barriers to entry • Bid rigging • Black cause • Block exemption (Regulation) • Boycott • Brand competition • Burden of proof • Business secrets • Buyer power

C

Cartel • Clearance phase I (merger) • Clearance phase II (merger) • Collecting society • Collective dominance • Collective redress (class action) • Comity • Competence • Competition policy • Complaint • Compliance programme • Compulsory license • Concerted practices • Concession • Concurrent jurisdiction • Consumers protection • Consumers’ associations • Contract • Control (change) • Control (notion) • Cooperation Agreement • Cooperation between competition authorities • Coordinated effects • Copyright • Corporate group • Corruption • Cost-based access • Criminal sanctions • Cross subsidisation

D

Damages • Dawn raids • De minimis notice • Direct effect • Discriminatory practices • Distribution agreement • Dominance (notion)

E

ECHR • Economic analysis • Economic efficiency • Economies of scale • Effect on trade between Member States • Effective judicial protection • EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) & Court • Environmental protection • Essential facility • European Competition Network (ECN) • Excess prices • Exchanges of information • Exclusive distribution • Exclusive purchasing • Exclusive right (Art. 106 TFEU) • Exclusivity clause • Exhaustion • Extra-territoriality

F

Failing firm defence • Fidelity rebates • Fine • Fine mitigating • Foreign direct investment (FDI) • Form CO • Franchising • FRAND • Free riding

G

Geographic market • Group purchasing organization • Gun jumping

H

Hard core restrictions • Hearing officer • Horizontal agreement

I

Independence and impartiality • Individual exemption • Intellectual property right • Inter-brand competition • Interim measures • International co-operation • International competition network (ICN) • Investigations / inquiries

J

Joint control • Joint venture • Judicial review

L

Legal privilege • Leniency • Lerner index • Letter of rejection of complaints • Licensing • Limitation period • Low prices

M

Mandatary (distribution) • Margin squeeze • Market economy investor • Market power • Market share • Media pluralism • Merger (notion) • Merger (prohibition) • Merger (withdrawal) • Merger control procedure • Merger remedies • Minority shareholdings • Misinformation • Misinformation

N

Ne bis in idem • Network effect • Non-competition clause • Notification • Nullity

O

Oligopoly

R

Referral (merger) • Refusal to deal • Regulated prices • Regulation • Relevant market • Remedies (antitrust) • Request for information • Resale price maintenance (RPM) • Resale-below-cost • Restriction on exportation • Right against self-incrimination • Rights of defence • Rule of reason

S

Sector inquiry • Selective distribution • Services of general economic interest • Single branding • Sole control • Spill-over effects • Standard-Essential Patent (SEP) • State action defense • State aid (compatibility) • State aid (existing aid) • State aid (notification) • State aid (notion) • State aid (recovery) • State aid (tax ruling) • State aid (unlawful aid) • State measure • Substitutability • Sudden break of established business relationships

T

Test SIEC (merger) • Test SLC (merger) • Transfer of technology • Transfer pricing • Transparency • Trustee (mergers) • Turnover threshold (merger) • Two-sided market • Tying or tied selling

U

Undertaking (notion) • Unfair competition • Universal service • Upstream market

V

Vertical agreement • Vertical restraints (or restrictions)