The EU Court of Justice clarifies the conditions under which pay-for-delay agreements preventing generic versions of a patented medicine from entering the market or delaying such entry may constitute a restriction of competition "by object" or "by effect" as well as an abuse of dominant position (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma)

Mathieu, Sandrine; Lamarcq, Amélie

Previous article The EU Court of Justice clarifies for the first time when patent settlement agreements restricting a generic pharmaceutical company’s ability to enter the market infringes the EU antitrust rules (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma) Next article The EU Court of Justice renders a preliminary ruling stating that a dispute between an originator and a generics manufacturer constitutes evidence that they are potential competitors (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma)

30 Jan 2020

The EU Court of Justice clarifies the conditions under which pay-for-delay agreements preventing generic versions of a patented medicine from entering the market or delaying such entry may constitute a restriction of competition "by object" or "by effect" as well as an abuse of dominant position (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma)

KEYWORDS

References

EU Court of Justice, Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma, Press Release, 30 January 2020

EU Court of Justice, Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma, Case No. C‑307/18, Judgement, 30 January 2020

On 30 January 2020, the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) ruled on the applicability of competition law to settlement agreements between a holder of a pharmaceutical patent and manufacturers of generic medicines. In a judgment issued only a week after Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion [1], the CJEU clarifies the conditions under which ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements preventing generic versions of a patented medicine from entering the market or delaying such entry may constitute a restriction of competition ‘by object’ or ‘by effect” as well as an abuse of dominant position. I. The parties GlaxoSmithKline plc (‘GSK’) is one of the world’s largest multinational pharmaceutical companies. The other parties to the dispute are pharmaceutical companies producing generic drugs (‘generic

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Authors

Sandrine Mathieu
University of Liège

Belgium 3 contributions 787 visits
Amélie Lamarcq
Linklaters (Düsseldorf)

Germany 1 contribution 532 visits

Quotation

Sandrine Mathieu, Amélie Lamarcq, The EU Court of Justice clarifies the conditions under which pay-for-delay agreements preventing generic versions of a patented medicine from entering the market or delaying such entry may constitute a restriction of competition "by object" or "by effect" as well as an abuse of dominant position (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma), 30 January 2020, e-Competitions Pay-for-delay agreements, Art. N° 94657

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