The French Competition Authority dismisses collusion case against car rental companies due to lack of evidence that exchange of information led to strategic changes in their behavior (Europcar / Avis / Citer / Hertz / Sixt / EDA)

When Information Is Not (Market) Power: Using Quantitative Techniques To Show That Information Exchange Did Not Facilitate Collusion* Abstract On January 2015, the French competition authority claimed that some car rental companies infringed competition law by sharing monthly information related to revenue, number of contracts signed, market shares and average contract value at twelve airports in France. The Authority was concerned that this information exchange could facilitate collusion. Compass Lexecon examined the rental companies’ behaviour and market outcomes, using a range of statistical techniques. We showed that the information exchanged did not provide a reliable basis for coordination, that the rental companies did not appear to use the information as the Authority’s theory

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Authors

  • Compass Lexecon (Madrid)
  • Compass Lexecon (Paris)
  • Compass Lexecon (Madrid)
  • Compass Lexecon (Paris)

Quotation

Soledad Pereiras, David Sevy, Elena Zoido, Guillaume Duquesne, The French Competition Authority dismisses collusion case against car rental companies due to lack of evidence that exchange of information led to strategic changes in their behavior (Europcar / Avis / Citer / Hertz / Sixt / EDA), 27 February 2017, e-Competitions Exchange of information in associations of undertakings, Art. N° 87430

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