Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music rights by Universal has recently been published by the European Commission. Following a Phase II investigation, the acquisition was approved subject to commitments, which included the divestment of the Parlophone label. [1] On the same day as the Commission adopted its decision, the FTC issued a press-release stating that it would not be challenging the deal in the US. [2] Both the European Commission and the FTC emphasised during their respective investigations the high degree of product differentiation which characterises the recorded music industry: a consumer who wants to purchase a track by a particular EMI artist (say, the
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The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the new entity’s bargaining power (Universal Music Group / EMI Music)
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