The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the new entity’s bargaining power (Universal Music Group / EMI Music)

Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music rights by Universal has recently been published by the European Commission. Following a Phase II investigation, the acquisition was approved subject to commitments, which included the divestment of the Parlophone label. [1] On the same day as the Commission adopted its decision, the FTC issued a press-release stating that it would not be challenging the deal in the US. [2] Both the European Commission and the FTC emphasised during their respective investigations the high degree of product differentiation which characterises the recorded music industry: a consumer who wants to purchase a track by a particular EMI artist (say, the

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Authors

  • CRA International (Brussels)
  • The Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies (Geneva)
  • DG COMP (Brussels)

Quotation

Raphaël De Coninck, Damien Neven, Hans Zenger, The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the new entity’s bargaining power (Universal Music Group / EMI Music), 21 September 2012, e-Competitions Bulletin September 2012, Art. N° 87901

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