The US FTC employs an uncommon remedy to resolve the anticompetitive concerns of a merger-to-monopoly by requiring the merged firm to license a generic form of its breakthrough cancer pain drug to a third party (Cephalon / CIMA)

In two recent decisions involving pharmaceutical mergers – Cephalon/Cima, in August 2004, and Genzyme/Novazyme, in January 2004, a divided Federal Trade Commission was accused by dissenting Commissioners of breaking with precedent and allowing acquisitions involving innovator pharmaceuticals that, according to the dissenters, should have been blocked. Meanwhile the FTC has sought and obtained disgorgement of more than $6 million in allegedly ill-gotten gains from generic over-the-counter suppliers. The FTC’s recent pharmaceutical merger decisions, like its decisions in other industries, suggest a more nuanced approach to merger analysis – which often, but not always, favors merging parties. In Cephalon, Inc.’s acquisition of Cima Labs, Inc., the FTC majority decided that speeding up the

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers

Already Subscribed? Sign-in

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers.

Read one article for free

Sign-up to read this article for free and discover our services.

 

PDF Version

Authors

Quotation

Richard Liebeskind, William DeVinney, Bryan R. Dunlap, The US FTC employs an uncommon remedy to resolve the anticompetitive concerns of a merger-to-monopoly by requiring the merged firm to license a generic form of its breakthrough cancer pain drug to a third party (Cephalon / CIMA), 20 September 2004, e-Competitions September 2004, Art. N° 53263

Visites 160

All issues

  • Latest News issue 
  • All News issues
  • Latest Special issue 
  • All Special issues