Executive summary, by the Secretariat From the country submissions, the Secretariat Issues Paper, and the discussion at the roundtable in June 2009, the following points emerge: (1) Most competition authorities rely on one of two main tests applied to assess whether a merger has anti-competitive effects: (i) the dominance test and (ii) the significant lessening of competition (SLC) test. Some, such as the EU, have a hybrid test, which combines the dominance and the SLC standards. Under the dominance test a merger is anticompetitive and can be prohibited if it strengthens or creates a dominant position in the market. The notion of dominance is not clearly defined in economics but it certainly reaches situations in which a market leader with a degree of independence from competitive
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development holds a roundtable on standard for merger review
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