The Swiss Competition Commission opens the door to a more economic approach for vertical price fixing (Sécateurs et cisailles)

Under Swiss law, agreements containing vertical price fixing are presumed to suppress effective competition and, consequently, to be illegal (Art. 5(4) Cartel Act, hereafter “CartA”, and Art. 10(1) Communication on vertical agreements, hereafter “ComVert”). The presumption cannot be rebutted if the undertakings prove the mere existence of sufficient interbrand competition; the existence of sufficient intrabrand competition must also be demonstrated (Art. 10(2) “ComVert”). Even if the existence of intrabrand competition is demonstrated, the Swiss Competition Commission (hereafter “Comco”) considers that price fixing agreements notably impedes competition according to Art. 5(1) CartA (Art. 10(3) ComVert). In such a case, the undertakings concerned must prove that the restriction produces

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Damiano Canapa, Adrien Alberini, The Swiss Competition Commission opens the door to a more economic approach for vertical price fixing (Sécateurs et cisailles), 25 May 2009, e-Competitions May 2009, Art. N° 29109

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