Introduction On 29 March 2017, the European Commission issued its decision prohibiting the merger between Deutsche Börse AG (“DBAG”) and London Stock Exchange Group (“LSEG”). [1] The Commission was concerned about, inter alia, the risk of foreclosure in the markets for post-trade services. In this brief we consider the economic underpinnings of the Commission’s theory of harm and conclude that the foreclosure concerns were not justified. The markets for the provision of post-trade services The parties offer listing, trading, and clearing services [2], as well as post- trade services, which include (i) settlement and custody services (“SCS”), [3]. and (ii) collateral management services (“CMS”) [4]. The Commission’s theory of harm that we analyse here concerned the provision of those
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The EU Commission issues a decision prohibiting a merger between two stock exchange companies due to the risk of foreclosure in the markets for post-trade services (Deutsche Börse / London Stock Exchange Group)
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