The EU Court of Justice clarifies the conditions under which pay-for-delay agreements may constitute a restriction of competition "by object" or "by effect" as well as an abuse of dominant position (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma)

On 30 January 2020, the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) ruled on the applicability of competition law to settlement agreements between a holder of a pharmaceutical patent and manufacturers of generic medicines. In a judgment issued only a week after Advocate General Kokott delivered her Opinion [1], the CJEU clarifies the conditions under which ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements preventing generic versions of a patented medicine from entering the market or delaying such entry may constitute a restriction of competition ‘by object’ or ‘by effect” as well as an abuse of dominant position. I. The parties GlaxoSmithKline plc (‘GSK’) is one of the world’s largest multinational pharmaceutical companies. The other parties to the dispute are pharmaceutical companies producing generic drugs