The EU Commission concludes that the merger of a financial trading platform and a financial data provider will lead to an incentive to raise rival costs due to its dominance on the market if conditions are not met (Refinitiv / London Stock Exchange Group)

LSEG/Refinitiv: Modelling of efficiencies in non-horizontal mergers* The Commission’s non-horizontal merger guidelines acknowledge that vertical mergers provide substantial scope for efficiencies but also outline an efficiencies assessment based on the framework developed in horizontal merger guidelines, namely that the efficiencies have to benefit consumers, be merger-specific and be verifiable. Holding the efficiencies in non-horizontal mergers that arise due to the well-established elimination of double marginalization (“EDM”) to the same standard as efficiencies in horizontal mergers misses a key difference between these two settings. In a horizontal merger, incentives to increase price due to internalization of competition between the merging parties and incentives to reduce price

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers

Already Subscribed? Sign-in

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers.

Read one article for free

Sign-up to read this article for free and discover our services.

 

PDF Version

Authors

  • CRA International (London)
  • CRA International (Chicago)
  • CRA International (London)

Quotation

Daniel Donath, Robert Stillman, Uğur Akgün, The EU Commission concludes that the merger of a financial trading platform and a financial data provider will lead to an incentive to raise rival costs due to its dominance on the market if conditions are not met (Refinitiv / London Stock Exchange Group), 26 February 2021, e-Competitions February 2021, Art. N° 99601

Visites 125

All issues

  • Latest News issue 
  • All News issues
  • Latest Special issue 
  • All Special issues