The OECD holds a roundtable on minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates

Executive summary, by the Secretariat Considering the discussion at the roundtable, the member country submissions, and the background paper, a number of key points emerge: (1) Minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates can have negative effects on competition, either by reducing the minority shareholder's incentives to compete (unilateral effects), or by facilitating collusion (coordinated effects). Regardless of the analytical framework and any characterization issues, the competition analysis should always focus on whether there is sufficient evidence in each specific case to support the conclusion that substantial anticompetitive effects are likely to result from minority shareholdings or interlocking directorates. A minority shareholding exists when a shareholder

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  • OECD - Competition Division (Paris)

Quotation

OECD, The OECD holds a roundtable on minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates , 1 February 2008, e-Competitions February 2008, Art. N° 85666

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