CRA International (Brussels)

Raphaël De Coninck

CRA International (Brussels)
Vice President

Raphaël De Coninck is a Vice President at Charles River Associates (CRA) and heads CRA’s Brussels Office, which he joined from the European Commission. He has extensive experience in the application of economic analysis and quantitative techniques within the context of competition law. Raphaël has provided expert economic advice in numerous high-profile mergers (e.g., Novartis/GSK, Delta/Virgin, Universal/EMI, Canal+/TPS, WesternDigital/Hitachi, Seagate/Samsung, Cisco/Tandberg, Kraft/Cadbury,Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, Panasonic/Sanyo, EDF/British Energy, TomTom/TeleAtlas, Nokia/Navteq, Thomson/Reuters,Travelport/Worldspan, Endesa/Gas Natural, Sony/BMG), as well as in complex antitrust, cartel and private damages cases, both at the European and national level. As a member of the Chief Economist Team at DG Competition, he contributed to major competition policy initiatives, including the Best Practices for Economic Submissions and Data Collection in Merger and Antitrust cases, the Ex-officio Methodology for Cartel Investigations, and the Guidance Paper on the Quantification of Antitrust Damages in Civil Proceedings. He previously lectured on law and economics in the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago and held a postdoctoral research fellow position at New York University School of Law. Raphaël is listed as a leading competition economist in The International Who’s Who of Competition Lawyers & Economists. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago and degrees in law and in economics from the University of Liège.


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Raphael De Coninck, CRA
Raphaël De Coninck 25 March 2014 Washington DC


4292 Bulletin

Raphaël De Coninck Excessive Prices: An overview of EU and national case law


One fundamental difference between the European and American approaches to unilateral conduct relates to the treatment of exploitative conduct, including excessive prices. While the mere charging of monopoly prices is not unlawful under US antitrust law, which recognizes high prices as an important element of the free-market system that rewards innovation, exploitative practices by a dominant company are in principle considered abusive under EU law, even if the exploitative conduct is not accompanied by other anticompetitive practices.

Damien Neven, Hans Zenger, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the bargaining power of the new entity (Universal Music Group / EMI Music)


This article has been nominated for the 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music rights (...)

Augustijn Van Haasteren, Cyril Hariton, Krisztian Kecsmar, Pablo Asbo, Polyvios Panayides, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission approves, subject to conditions, an acquisition in the Belgian electricity market (EDF / Segebel)


EDF/Segebel (SPE) - More power to boost competition in Belgian energy markets* I. Introduction In September 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration whereby Electricité de France («EDF») would acquire from Centrica, a UK energy company, a 100% stake in Segebel (...)

Miriam Driessen-Reilly, Polyvios Panayides, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission accepts, subject to conditions, a takeover of a company in the electricity sector (EDF / British Energy)


I. Introduction On 24 September 2008, following ongoing talks with British Energy, EdF announced that it had agreed a takeover of the company for the sum of £12.5 billion. On 3 November 2008, given that the transaction had a Community dimension within the meaning of the Merger Regulation, EdF (...)

15829 Review

Jorge Padilla, Olivier d’Ormesson, Raphaël De Coninck Quantifying damages in civil proceedings: Can economists and should competition authorities help? (New Frontiers of Antitrust Conference - Paris, 11 February 2011)


La deuxième table-ronde de la conférence New Frontiers of Antitrust du 11 février 2011 à Paris est dédiée à la quantification des dommages dans les procedures civiles. Raphael de Coninck, membre de l’équipe du chef économiste de la Commission européenne, présente dans la première contribution, plusieurs (...)

Raphaël De Coninck Estimating private antitrust damages


In light of the European Commission’s recent initiatives to bolster private antitrust enforcement, this paper discusses the general economic framework for damages estimation, reviews common empirical methods used by economic experts and highlights some of the practical challenges for estimating (...)


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