Raphaël De Coninck
CRA International (Brussels)
Vice President
Raphaël De Coninck is a Vice President at Charles River Associates (CRA) and heads CRA’s Brussels Office, which he joined from the European Commission. He has extensive experience in the application of economic analysis and quantitative techniques within the context of competition law. Raphaël has provided expert economic advice in numerous high-profile mergers (e.g., Novartis/GSK, Delta/Virgin, Universal/EMI, Canal+/TPS, WesternDigital/Hitachi, Seagate/Samsung, Cisco/Tandberg, Kraft/Cadbury,Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, Panasonic/Sanyo, EDF/British Energy, TomTom/TeleAtlas, Nokia/Navteq, Thomson/Reuters,Travelport/Worldspan, Endesa/Gas Natural, Sony/BMG), as well as in complex antitrust, cartel and private damages cases, both at the European and national level. As a member of the Chief Economist Team at DG Competition, he contributed to major competition policy initiatives, including the Best Practices for Economic Submissions and Data Collection in Merger and Antitrust cases, the Ex-officio Methodology for Cartel Investigations, and the Guidance Paper on the Quantification of Antitrust Damages in Civil Proceedings. He previously lectured on law and economics in the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago and held a postdoctoral research fellow position at New York University School of Law. Raphaël is listed as a leading competition economist in The International Who’s Who of Competition Lawyers & Economists. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago and degrees in law and in economics from the University of Liège.
Distinctions
Nominee, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards: Business, Economics
Nominee, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Unilateral Conduct
Nominee, 2018 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Economics
Winner, 2017 Antitrust Writing Awards: Business, Mergers
Winner, 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards: Business, Mergers
Linked authors
Penelope Papandropoulos
DG COMP (Brussels)
David Sevy
Compass Lexecon (Paris)
Gunnar Niels
Oxera (Oxford)
Theon van Dijk
E.CA Economics (Brussels)
Frank Verboven
Leuven University
Robin Noble
Oxera
Krisztian Kecsmar
DG COMP (Brussels)
Augustijn Van Haasteren
DG COMP (Brussels)
2187 | Conferences
Videos
Articles
3209 Bulletin
1741
One fundamental difference between the European and American approaches to unilateral conduct relates to the treatment of exploitative conduct, including excessive prices. While the mere charging of monopoly prices is not unlawful under US antitrust law, which recognizes high prices as an important element of the free-market system that rewards innovation, exploitative practices by a dominant company are in principle considered abusive under EU law, even if the exploitative conduct is not accompanied by other anticompetitive practices.
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Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music rights by Universal has recently been published by the European Commission. Following a Phase II investigation, the acquisition was approved (...)
1218
"EDF/Segebel (SPE) - More power to boost competition in Belgian energy markets"* I. Introduction In September 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration whereby Electricité de France («EDF») would acquire from Centrica, a UK energy company, a 100% stake in Segebel (...)
91
I. Introduction On 24 September 2008, following ongoing talks with British Energy, EdF announced that it had agreed a takeover of the company for the sum of £12.5 billion. On 3 November 2008, given that the transaction had a Community dimension within the meaning of the Merger Regulation, EdF (...)
15107 Review
963
The authors of this On-Topic focus on the latest developments in the pharmaceutical sector. According to Ms Thill-Tayara, author of the first contribution and lawyer with Dechert Paris, if the competition agencies’ activism is partly motivated by the need to limit the expenses of national health (...)
905
This set of contributions presents the various competitive effects associated with minority shareholdings. It also considers how these effects can be dealt with either through notifications to the competition authority, especially with the case of the German and British legislations, or through (...)
2557
La deuxième table-ronde de la conférence New Frontiers of Antitrust du 11 février 2011 à Paris est dédiée à la quantification des dommages dans les procedures civiles. Raphael de Coninck, membre de l’équipe du chef économiste de la Commission européenne, présente dans la première contribution, plusieurs (...)
2537
This mini-symposium takes stock of practical advances in competition damage evaluation. Combining perspectives from competition authorities, academics and practitioners respectively, it shows the existence of common principles and a set of widely accepted methods to calculate damages that may (...)
2690
In light of the European Commission’s recent initiatives to bolster private antitrust enforcement, this paper discusses the general economic framework for damages estimation, reviews common empirical methods used by economic experts and highlights some of the practical challenges for estimating (...)
5455
On the 28th of November 2007, the Commission adopted the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. This article illustrates how these guidelines are applied in practice by reviewing the economic analysis undertaken in Google/DoubleClick and TomTom/TeleAtlas, two recent mergers that raised (...)
