Linda Gratz

E.CA Economics (Berlin)
Principal

Linda Gratz joined E.CA in June 2012. She has extensive case experience before the European Commission and national competition authorities. W@Competition named her as one of the ’30 in their 30s’ Notable Women in Competition Economics. Linda has conducted overcharge and damage assessments in various cartel matters (e.g. industrial and consumer goods industries, GIS, fire engines, interchange fees in card payments, lottery). She has extensive experience in the application of qualitative and quantitative economic analysis of cost pass-through. Her broad experience of mergers includes involvement in large phase II cases (e.g. Holcim/ Cemex West, Morawa/ PGA, GoodMills/ PMG). In addition, she has worked on abuse of dominance cases and sector inquiries (e.g. public transportation, construction). Linda has also advised a German ministry on organisational as well as methodological aspects of ex-post evaluations of state aid. She has been closely involved in advising the Austrian cartel court in the assessment of the likely impact of the removal of price fixing and territorial protection in the Austrian press market. And she has contributed to the OECD Roundtable on the Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings. During a traineeship in the Chief Economist Team in DG Competition she has been involved in three IP-related antitrust cases and one major merger case. Linda holds a Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of Munich, where she specialized in the field of industrial organisation. Her work has been published in journals including the International Journal of Industrial Organization and the Journal of Competition Law & Economics.

Distinctions

Linked author

E.CA Economics (Brussels)

Articles

2181 Bulletin

Linda Gratz, Theon van Dijk Margin squeeze: Recent developments in EU and national case law

2181

Dominant undertakings, which are active in upstream and downstream markets, can squeeze margins of their downstream competitors by setting a relatively high price upstream (the input costs of their downstream competitors) and a relatively low price downstream. As margin squeeze can lead to foreclosure of downstream competitors, it constitutes a potential price-based exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, which is dealt with under Article 102 TFEU.

Books

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