Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton (Washington)

Jeremy J. Calsyn

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton (Washington)
Lawyer (Partner)

Jeremy Calsyn is a partner based in the Washington, D.C. office. Mr. Calsyn’s practice focuses on transactional antitrust matters, criminal and civil Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigations, and antitrust litigation in federal and state courts, including complex class actions. Mr. Calsyn is recognized as a leading antitrust lawyer by Chambers USA and The Legal 500 U.S. In 2012, Global Competition Review’s “40 Under 40” survey named him among the most talented competition lawyers under 40 years old.Mr. Calsyn joined the firm in 1999 and became partner in 2008. He received a J.D. degree, magna cum laude, from Georgetown University Law Center in 1999 and an undergraduate degree, summa cum laude, from Southwest Missouri State University in 1995. From 2000 to 2001 he served as law clerk to the Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Mr. Calsyn is a member of the Bars in California and the District of Columbia.

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Articles

1322 Bulletin

Leah Brannon, Brian Byrne, Jeremy J. Calsyn, George S. Cary, Alexis Collins The US State of New York Senate adopts the Twenty-First Century Antitrust Act to amend its state antitrust law

334

The New York state Senate has passed the “Twenty-First Century Antitrust Act” (S. 933) to amend its state antitrust law, radically changing the risks of doing business in New York. It ostensibly aims at so-called “Big Tech,” but applies to all businesses, even those having very little contact with (...)

Leah Brannon, Brian R. Byrne, Jeremy J. Calsyn, George S. Cary, Alexis Collins, Daniel P. Culley, Elaine Ewing, David I. Gelfand, Bruce Hoffman, Mark W. Nelson, Kenneth Reinker The US FTC issues commentary on vertical merger enforcement explaining the approach to assessing the competitive effects of vertical mergers

74

On December 22, 2020, the US Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) issued a Commentary on Vertical Merger Enforcement. This follows the recent issuance of revised Vertical Merger Guidelines published jointly by the FTC and Department of Justice (the “Agencies”) on June 30, 2020. While the Guidelines (...)

Jeremy J. Calsyn, Patrick Bock The US FTC imposes conduct remedies prior to clearing a vertical merger causing anticompetitive concerns in the soft drink industry (PepsiCo / Pepsi Bottling)

283

After a decade of what was perceived by many as relatively restrained merger enforcement, the Obama administration has repeatedly and vocally vowed to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement” and to “take effective action to stop or restructure mergers that are likely to harm consumer[s]”. Many (...)

Jeremy J. Calsyn, Patrick Bock The US District Court for the District of Columbia seeks to divest part of a business and requires a licensing of software to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of a merger in the ticketing services industry (Ticketmaster / Live Nation)

364

After a decade of what was perceived by many as relatively restrained merger enforcement, the Obama administration has repeatedly and vocally vowed to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement” and to “take effective action to stop or restructure mergers that are likely to harm consumer[s]”. Many (...)

Jeremy J. Calsyn, Patrick Bock The US FTC employs a creative remedy, requiring the offer of divestiture to determine the existence of a viable alternative purchaser, before approving the merger of acute care hospitals (King’s Daughters Hospital / Scott & White)

267

After a decade of what was perceived by many as relatively restrained merger enforcement, the Obama administration has repeatedly and vocally vowed to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement” and to “take effective action to stop or restructure mergers that are likely to harm consumer[s]”. Many (...)

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