University of Chicago

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago
Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law

Eric Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. His research interests include financial regulation, antitrust law, and constitutional law. He has written a dozen books and more than a hundred academic articles on law and legal theory. His most recent books are Radical Markets (Princeton) (with Glen Weyl), which was named a best book for 2018 by The Economist; Last Resort: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Bailouts (Chicago), which was named a best book for 2018 by The Financial Times; and The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford). His latest book, How Antitrust Failed Workers, will be published by Oxford in 2021. He is also a Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.


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University of Chicago
University of Chicago - Law School
Compass Lexecon (Chicago)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Chicago)
University of Chicago - Law School


1711 Bulletin

Eric A. Posner, Cristina Volpin No-poach agreements: An overview of EU and national case law


No-poach agreements have received increased attention by competition authorities, especially in the United States, as part of a broader movement to address anticompetitive behavior by employers in labor markets. A no-poach agreement is an agreement between employers not to hire away each other’s employees. A no-poach agreement is actually just one of a family of related agreements among employers that have the purpose and effect of reducing competition in labor markets. Employers have also been accused of agreeing not to solicit or “cold call” one another’s employees, and of fixing wages and exchanging information about compensation. There are also vertical no-poach agreements, for example, between staffing agencies and the firms to which they supply workers.

5337 Review

Eric A. Posner Antitrust is back in America


With growing momentum behind efforts to reform and strengthen US antitrust enforcement, a decades-long trend toward increasing market concentration may soon be confronted head-on. But enforcement alone will not cure what ails the US economy—especially not when US consumers themselves are (...)

Eric A. Posner, Cristina Volpin Labor monopsony and European competition law


Recent economic research indicates that labor markets tend to be highly concentrated, and that employers use mergers, no-poaching agreements, and related collusive behavior to further concentrate labor markets and exploit labor market power at the expense of workers. In the United States, this (...)


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