MAPP (Paris)

David Spector

Paris School of Economics, MAPP (Paris)
Economist, Professor

David Spector is an Associate Professor at the Paris School of Economics and a research fellow at CNRS. After a training in mathematics at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and an Economics Ph.D. at the London School of Economics, he was an Assistant Professor at the Economics department of MIT until 2001. David Spector’s publications and teaching deal with the theory of oligopolistic competition, with a focus on exclusionary practices, mergers, and collusion. He also published a book on the electricity market (Electricité : faut-il désespérer du marché ?, Editions Rue d’Ulm, 2007), and, more recently, a book on the history of the debates on competition, trade and the market mechanism in France (La gauche, la droite et le marché, Editions Odile Jacob, 2017), which won the BFM award for the best economics book of the year. David Spector is also the founder of MAPP, a competition economics consultancy. In this capacity, he has been producing economic expert reports in merger, cartel, abuse of dominance, and State aid cases, before national competition authorities as well as the European Commission, appeals courts and courts of arbitration.

Linked authors

KPMG (London)
KPMG (Roma)
MAPP (Paris)
KPMG (Madrid)
Paris School of Economics

24941 | Conferences


David Spector
David Spector 26 June 2017 Paris


24960 Bulletin

David Spector The Paris Court of Appeal upholds the Competition Authority’s decision to fine a manufacturer for exclusive distribution agreements and RPM but annuls the part of the decision regarding rebates (Royal Canin)


Background In a decision dated June 22, 2005, the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) imposed a fine of € 2,500,000 on Royal Canin, a manufacturer of pet food, and fines ranging from € 1,000 to € 1,500,000 on several of its wholesalers and retailers. The FCA held that (i) Royal Canin and its (...)

172516 Review

David Spector, Etienne Pfister, Joseph Vogel Distribution networks and competition law


Paradoxically, competition law today is frequently used more as a weapon of defence than to challenge networks, and notably against certain rules of national law. When relied on as a means of challenging networks, competition law is mainly used either to circumvent the networks, or to gain (...)

Andreas Bardong, Bernard van de Walle de Ghelcke, David Bosco, David Spector, Jacques-Philippe Gunther, Peter Freeman, Peter Kalbfleisch Merger control and minority shareholdings : Time for a change ?


Ce Tendances revient sur le débat qu’a ravivé l’affaire Aer Lingus/Ryanair autour du traitement des participations minoritaires dans le contrôle des concentrations. La difficulté principale tient dans le point de savoir si, et dans quelle mesure, le droit des concentrations doit s’appliquer aux (...)

Christophe Lemaire, David Spector, François Lévêque, Michaël Cousin, Philippe de Ladoucette, Simon Genevaz NOME act I : A legislative framework for the opening of the French electricity market


The law establishing a New Organisation for the Electricty Market provides for a temporary regulation which aims at removing the obstacles to the development of competition on the French electricity market. Its purpose is in particular to solve the margin squeeze resulting from the difference (...)

David Spector, Etienne Pfister, Olivier Fréget Predatory strategies


This set of three papers is derived from the training session on the predatory strategies organised by Concurrences Review that has held on 5th July 2010 in Paris. The first paper is a short introduction of the Economist Etienne Pfister presenting the preemptive strategies and how these (...)

David Spector The impact of competition policy on firms’ valuation


Une analyse statistique des décisions rendues par le Conseil de la concurrence entre 1992 et 2000 montre que la politique de la concurrence a eu un impact important sur les entreprises sanctionnées, bien supérieur au dommage directement infligé par les amendes, au demeurant modestes au cours de (...)

Agnès Maitrepierre, Alain Ménéménis, Amandine Zelenko, Anne Fort, Carine Soulay, Christian Lambert, Christopher Bellamy QC, David Spector, Denys de Bechillon, Emmanuel Glaser, Eric Ginter, François Tanguy, Guylain Clamour, Jacques Biancarelli, Jacques Derenne, Jean-Christophe Moraud, Jean-Claude Bonichot, Jean-Louis Colson, Jean-Marc Sauvé, Jean-Yves Chérot, Laurent Richer, Marie-Christine Lepetit, Marie-Dominique Hagelsteen, Mario Monti, Philippe Martin, Pierre-François Racine State Aid Colloquium, 14 March 2008


TABLE OF CONTENTS OPENING REMARKS Mr Jean-Marc SAUVÉ, Vice-President of the Conseil d’Etat Mr Mario MONTI, Former European Commissioner for Competition, President of the Bocconi University of Milan IS STATE AID CONTROL POLICY A COMPETITION POLICY? Introduction: Mrs Marie-Dominique (...)

David Spector Addressing buyer power in merger control


While competition authorities often take countervailing buyer power into account when assessing the competitive impact of a merger between sellers, they have so far been more reluctant to consider positively the creation or strengthening of buyer power resulting from a merger. This paper (...)

David Spector Competition policy in the energy sector: Squaring the circle?


Les caractéristiques techniques de l’électricité et du gaz, tant du côté de l’offre que de la demande, rendent ces secteurs différents de tous les autres. Du fait des particularités du mode de formation des prix de l’électricité, l’intégration des marchés peut ne pas bénéficier aux consommateurs même si (...)

Daniel Fasquelle, David Spector, Dominique de Gramont, Jean-Patrice de La Laurencie, Jérôme Bédier, Muriel Chagny «Chatel» Law: A new deal for producers & distributors - Some legal and economic points of view


INTRODUCTORY WORDS Jean-Patrice DE LAURENCIE Counsel to the Court I. Brief presentation of the law 1. Law No. 2008-3 of 3 January 2008 "for the development of competition in the service of consumers’ (OJ of 4 January 2008, p. 258), already The Chatel law, known as the "Chatel law", has two (...)

David Spector Some economics of margin squeeze


I. A recent and complex concept 1. A side-effect of deregulation 1. According to the Court of First Instance, a margin squeeze arises when a vertically integrated firm sells an upstream good to non-integrated downstream rivals at a price which cannot leave “an efficient competitor”1 “a (...)

David Spector Will efficiencies ever matter in merger control?


Although the new EU Merger Control Regulation explicitly mentions the taking into account of efficiencies, these almost never determine the decision finally adopted. This is to some extent due to the difficulty of demonstrating that the three cumulative conditions are met (verifiability, (...)

David Spector Minimum resale prices: Is a ban justified?


The systematic hostility towards minimum resale prices in most jurisdictions - at least until the recent Leegin Decision by the U.S. Supreme Court - lacks solid economic foundations. Economic theory identified mechanisms through which minimum resale prices might be procompetitive or (...)

David Spector The antitrust economics of bidding markets


The notion of bidding markets encompasses a broad variety of situations, and such markets do not warrant a general favourable or unfavourable presumption for antitrust enforcement. But their characteristics call for specific types of economic analyses. In particular, the study of bidding data (...)

David Spector Exclusivity clauses: The French Competition Council holds that bundling is not abusive if they do not cause rivals’ eviction, even in the absence of any objective justifications (Advertising in cinemas)


Conc. conc. dec. 06-D-18 of 28 June 2006 on practices in the film advertising sector This decision of the Competition Council confirms that a high market share is not sufficient to conclude that a dominant position exists or that an exclusivity clause resembling tying is abusive. The case (...)

David Spector The economic policy of State Aids: The assessment criteria


In the absence of any control at Community level, individual European States might grant large amounts of economically inefficient aid to businesses. This results from the weight of special interests and short-term preoccupations in domestic policymaking, as well as from the presence of (...)

David Spector Rebates: The French Competition Council enjoins press distributors to suspend agreements granting conditional rebates to retailers (Messageries Lyonnaises de Presse et Agora Diffusion Presse)


Competition Council orders courier companies to suspend agreements granting conditional rebates to broadcasters Conc. conc. dec. no. 06-MC-01 of 23 February 2006 relating to a request for precautionary measures presented by the companies Messageries Lyonnaises de Presse and Agora Diffusion (...)

David Spector Predatory pricing: The French Competition Council defines the relevant cost benchmark for a predatory pricing assessment in the case of a firm using the same assets for a public service activity and for an activity taking place in a competitive market (RPDEV)


Cons. conc. dec. n° 04-D-79 of 23 December 2004 relating to practices implemented by the Régie départementale des passages d’eau de la Vendée (RDPEV) The Council rejected the grievances notified by the Rapporteur against the Régie Départementale des passages d’eau de Vendée (hereinafter the Régie) (...)

David Spector Internet access provision: The French Competition Council rejects the objections leveled against France Telecom in the sector of Internet access provision (France Télécom)


Concordant Consensus, Dec. 04-D-73 of 21 December 2004 on the situation of competition in the Internet access supply sector. The Competition Council has rejected the objections notified to France Telecom in the Internet access market. Following a referral by the company T-Online, the (...)

David Spector Margin squeeze practice: The French Competition Council condemns France Telecom and SFR Cegetel for margin squeeze practices regarding the price of fixed to mobile calls (France T’com-SFR Cegetel-Bouygues T’com)


Cons. conc. dec. no. 04-D-48 of October 14, 2004 relating to practices implemented by France Telecom, SFR Cegetel and Bouygues Telecom France Telecom and SFR Cegetel have just been sanctioned by the French Competition Council (Conseil de la concurrence) for "margin squeeze" practices in the (...)

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