CRA International (London)

Daniel Donath

CRA International (London)
Competition Economist

Dan Donath is a Vice President in CRA’s Competition Economics Team in London. His key expertise is the application of empirical analyses and econometric techniques in the context of competition investigations, disputes and arbitrations. He was previously an internal advisor at CEZ, the Czech energy incumbent, on all aspects of competition and regulatory issues. He has been a member of the Chief Economist’s Team in DG Competition at the European Commission since 2007. During this time, he has mostly been involved in merger investigations, including 5 Phase II investigations (Arjowiggins/M-Real Zanders Reflex, Älo/MX, Arsenal/DSP, Statoil/Conoco and Lufthansa/SN). He is also a member of the Appellate Committee of the Czech Competition Office that provides guidance to the Chairman on cases that are appealed to him following the First Phase decision of the Office. Prior to both of these appointments, Dan was an Associate Principal at CRA (previously Lexecon Ltd) in London, where he worked on a number of competition cases before the European Commission (including adidas/Reebok and Ryanair/Air Lingus on behalf of Aer Lingus), the OFT and the UK Competition Commission, the German Bundeskartellamt, and the Slovakian Antimonopoly Office. Prior to joining CRA, he was a Manager in Deloitte’s Economic Consulting practice in Washington, D.C., where he focused on damages calculations and regulatory analysis in the telecommunications and financial services industries. Dan holds a PhD in Economics from the Pennsylvania State University, USA.

Linked authors

CRA International (London)
CRA International (Toronto)
CRA International (London)
CRA International (Munich)
CRA International (London)


1323 Bulletin

Daniel Donath, Robert Stillman, Uğur Akgün The EU Commission concludes that the merger of a financial trading platform and a financial data provider will lead to an incentive to raise rival costs due to its dominance on the market if conditions are not met (Refinitiv / London Stock Exchange Group)


LSEG/Refinitiv: Modelling of efficiencies in non-horizontal mergers* The Commission’s non-horizontal merger guidelines acknowledge that vertical mergers provide substantial scope for efficiencies but also outline an efficiencies assessment based on the framework developed in horizontal merger (...)

Cyril Hariton, Dag Johansson, Daniel Donath, Elzbieta Glowicka, Jérôme Cloarec, Philippe Redondo The EU Commission conditionally approves a merger in the retail fuel sector using customer surveys and econometric studies to assess the likelihood of anticompetitive effects (StatoilHydro / ConocoPhillips)


Fuel for thought - StatoilHydro/ConocoPhillips (Jet)* I. Introduction When faced with a proposed merger, antitrust authorities have to assess the likelihood and the magnitude of anticompetitive effects that may occur following the removal of one of the merging parties as an independent force (...)

4339 Review

Send a message