Damien Neven is Professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. He is also member of the advisory board and Senior Academic Consultant at Compass Lexecon. He holds a doctorate in economics from Nuffield College, Oxford and has taught at INSEAD, the College of Europe and the University of Lausanne. He has acted as Chief Competition Economist at the European Commission from September 2006 to May 2011. He was closely involved in a number of key developments, both in terms of policy and case assessment. These included the adoption of the Non Horizontal Mergers merger guidelines, the Guidance Paper on the Priorities for the Enforcement of Article 102, the Guidelines on horizontal agreements and the Guidelines on the Submission and Evaluation of Economic Evidence. He has written numerous books and articles on competition economic and the economics of industry. His current research interests focus on merger control, exclusionary abuses and the coordination of enforcement across jurisdictions. Before he joined the European Commission, he was involved as advisor in a number of landmark cases, including Airtours/First Choice, Volvo/Scania and Tetra Laval/Sidel. Since he left the Commission, he has been involved in a number of high profile cases including UPS/TNT, Universal/EMI, Qualcomm (rebates in the EU), Tetra Pak China and Tetra Pak Chile (rebates), Samsumg (SEP in the EU), Monsanto/Bayer, Huawei/UP (litigation on SEP).
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Roundtable Discussion on the ECJ ruling in Intel* On 6 September 2017, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) issued a landmark judgment where it set aside the judgment of the General Court (“GC”) in the highly debated Intel matter. This judgment is of particular significance because it provides (...)
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This article has been nominated for the 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music rights (...)
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This series of articles presents different points of view about the priorities of the newly established Commission on competition policy in Europe in the aftermath of the decision prohibiting the Siemens/Alstom merger and of the manifesto published by French and German governments. These (...)
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We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a first phase of investigation. We find that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the first phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the (...)
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This article argues that there is no presumption that tax rulings distort competition between firms. Rather, tax rulings should be considered, in the same way as subsidy races, as detrimental to the achievement in the internal market. Finally, we argue that the in the presence of complex (...)
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It was questionable whether this important judgment would close the debate on the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. Will it put an end to the controversial and even polemical topics related to the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU and in particular to the debate on the effects-based (...)
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The 2009 decision of the EU Commission imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel, and the subsequent judgment of the General Court (GC) upholding the decision have sparked an intense debate as to the way Article 102 TFEU should be applied. This On-Topic adds to the fervent discussion with (...)
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This set of two papers is derived from the training session on “Competition Policy and National Champions” organized by Concurrences Journal in Brussels the 15th July 2014. In the first paper, Damien Neven (professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of Geneva) argues that a change in EU (...)
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Douglas H. Ginsburg Liber Amicorum : An Antitrust Professor on the Bench Vol. I
This first volume of Douglas H. Ginsburg Liber Amicorum gathers original essays that pay tribute to the exceptional career of Judge Ginsburg. Known in the legal community as a “giant in antitrust (...)
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