Céline Gauer

DG COMP (Brussels)
Deputy Head of Unit

Céline Gauer is Head of the Antitrust Unit responsible for the energy and environment sectors in the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission. She studied law and Political Science in Paris and joined the European Commission in 1994. After three years of enforcement of competition rules against cartels, she became involved in the reform of antitrust procedural rules. She was part of the team responsible for the drafting of the Commission’s proposal and for the negotiation of Regulation No 1/2003. From 2003 to 2006, she contributed to setting-up the European Competition Network and was responsible for the coordination of national antitrust cases. She was also in charge of various policy issues relating to leniency and to due process in antitrust proceedings. In 2006, she was appointed Deputy Head of Unit responsible for the coordination of the Commission’s antitrust cases. She is heading the Antitrust Unit "Energy and environment" since 2008.

Linked authors

University Paris II Panthéon‑Assas
University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III
University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Transport For London (TFL)
Jones Day (Brussels)
Jones Day (Brussels)


4896 Bulletin

Bernard Amory, Catherine Prieto, Céline Gauer, Christophe Lemaire, Francesca Marchini Càmia, Jean-Christophe Roda, Laurence Idot, Marie-Barde Girard Les politiques de clémence en Europe


NB 1: Leniency programs are now a well established and efficient policies through Europe, both at the EU level and at the national levels. In this sery of 5 articles, EU and national policy officers, academics and practionners give various points of view on the use of lenieny programs in the EU (...)

Céline Gauer, Maria Jaspers The European Competition Network publishes results of its work on the model leniency programme setting out the basis for soft harmonisation of all European leniency programmes


"ECN Model Leniency Programme - a first step towards a harmonised leniency policy in the EU"* I. Introduction The co-existence of several leniency programmes within the EU and the practical implications of the ECN work-sharing mechanisms for the handling of leniency cases has been debated (...)

Céline Gauer, Dominik Schnichels, Dorothe Dalheimer, Eddy de Smijter, Lars Kjølbye, Maija Laurila The Council of the EU adopts new rules on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82


"Regulation 1/2003 and the Modernisation Package fully applicable since 1 May 2004"* A. Overview of the new rules As from 1st May 2004, the new enforcement system for Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty is fully applicable. With the entry into application of Regulation 1/2003, Regulation 17/62 (...)

Céline Gauer, Dorothe Dalheimer, Eddy de Smijter, Lars Kjølbye The Council of the EU adopts a new regulation on the implementation of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Regulation 1/2003)


"Regulation 1/2003: a modernised application of EC competition rules"* I. Introduction On 16 December 2002, the Council adopted a new Regulation on the implementation of Articles 81 and 82 EC: Regulation 1/2003 (OJ 2003, L1/1). This Regulation replaces Regulation 17, which for over 40 years (...)

20344 Review

Céline Gauer, Jean-Patrice de La Laurencie, Jean-Yves Trochon, Joël Maurice The Minister of Economy as guardian of the general interest in mergers control - Contrasting perspectives (Paris, October 18th 2013)


This panel aimed at crossing the opinions of three personalities: a Director from DG Competition in Brussels, an economist from an institute of social relationship and the head of the legal service of an industrial group. They expressed different sensibilities in answering two questions: (1) (...)

Andreas Bardong, Céline Gauer, David Bosco, Etienne Pfister, Katrin Schallenberg, Oliver Bretz, Simon Genevaz, Tad Lipsky Market tests in antitrust and merger control proceedings


Nowadays, commitments decisions of the competition authorities are, most of the time, preceded by a consultation of third parties. These "market tests" have become a central step of the antitrust procedure and merger control. The authors of this Tendances present their experience in using this (...)

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