Erik Kjaer-Hansen

Gorrissen Federspiel (Copenhagen)

Erik Kjær-Hansen provides assistance in relation to competition law, state aid law and procurement law. He has comprehensive litigation experience and has conducted cases before the Supreme Court. In respect of competition law, Erik Kjær-Hansen focuses on litigation (including actions for damages), issues relating to dominant undertakings and cartel probes. In relation to procurement law, Erik assists authorities and undertakings in carrying through tenders, submitting tenderbids and conducting complaints procedures. Erik Kjær-Hansen has many years of experience handling matters for the media and entertainment industry and he is head of the firm’s cross practice group within this area of law. He has, inter alia, conducted a number of cases concerning media content. For a number of years Erik Kjær-Hansen has assisted undertakings and authorities in carrying through legal investigations and has provided assistance in relation to compliance and regulatory issues. He also acts as arbitrator.

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Gorrissen Federspiel (Copenhagen)
Gorrissen Federspiel (Copenhagen)
Gorrissen Federspiel (Copenhagen)
Gorrissen Federspiel (Copenhagen)
Gorrissen Federspiel (Aarhus)


794 Bulletin

Martin André Dittmer, Erik Kjaer-Hansen, Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe State aid & Public procurement: An overview of EU and national case law


This special issue explores recent case law and elaborates on the interplay between public procurement and State aid. The two fields of law share the common aim to ensure that competition is undistorted on the internal market. As regards State aid rules, TFEU contains a prohibition that excludes Member States from granting any kind of aid to an undertaking, which might place other undertakings at an unjustified competitive disadvantage. The objective of public procurement rules is to ensure that the competition for public contracts remains free and open; when a contracting authority awards a certain contract, it does so on the basis of either the lowest price or the most advantageous economic offer and irrespective of the nationality of the tenderer. Without these rules Member States would not be constrained in funding beneficial companies; either by granting favourable contracts to companies or through unrestricted subsidy.


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