Latham & Watkins (New York)

Carla Rita Palma

Latham & Watkins (New York)

Carla Rita Palma is an associate in the New York office of Latham & Watkins and a member of the firm’s Litigation & Trial Department. Prior to working in the New York office, Ms. Palma was an associate in the Washington, D.C. office. Ms. Palma represents public and private corporations in antitrust merger reviews, government investigations, and complex commercial litigation across a wide range of industries, including technology, energy, healthcare, life sciences, and financial services. In her pro bono practice, Ms. Palma represents and advises clients on domestic and gender-based violence. Ms. Palma received her JD from Georgetown University Law Center, graduating magna cum laude and Order of the Coif. She served as executive editor of the Georgetown Law Journal’s Annual Review of Criminal Procedure. Ms. Palma served as a law clerk at the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. She also served as a judicial intern for Judge Susan D. Wigenton on the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Ms. Palma attended the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, graduating summa cum laude.

Linked authors

Latham & Watkins (Paris)
Latham & Watkins (San Francisco)
Latham & Watkins (Hambourg)
Latham & Watkins (Brussels)
Latham & Watkins (London)


34 Bulletin

Makan Delrahim, Kelly Smith Fayne, Katherine Rocco, Joshua N. Holian, Niall Lynch, Elizabeth Prewitt, Nitesh Daryanani, Karen Keun-Yong Kim, Carla Rita Palma The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applies the functional framework for analyzing the ownership structures of private equity firms to hold that a company cannot conspire with an entity it owns and controls and with which it does not compete (OJ Commerce / Kidkraft / Ikea)


This article has been nominated for the 2023 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. PE firms with non-competitor, majority-owned portfolio companies will face reduced risks of antitrust liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the (...)


Total visits

Number of readings per contribution

Number of contributions

Author's ranking
In number of contributions
In number of visits
In average number of visits
Send a message