Terry Calvani is senior advisor at Brunswick Group in Washington, D.C. He joined Brunswick after retiring from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. Previously he was Commissioner of the US Federal Trade Commission (1983-1990) and was acting Chairman of the Commission during 1985 and 1986. From 1990 until 2002 Mr. Calvani was a partner in the antitrust practice group of Pillsbury Winthrop. From 2002 until June 2005, he was a Member (of the board) of the Irish Competition Authority and Director of the Criminal Cartels Division. He also held the mergers portfolio during 2003. From 1974-1983, he was Professor of Law at Vanderbilt School of Law teaching courses on antitrust law. More recently he has taught antitrust law at Duke University School of Law (2000), the Harvard Law School (1998-2001), Trinity College, Dublin (2004-2005), and Cornell Law School (2006). Mr. Calvani is listed as a leading antitrust and regulatory lawyer in many guides and directories and was recently named one of the top 20 antitrust lawyers globally by Who’s Who Legal published by Law Business Research. Terry Calvani’s practice focuses exclusively on antitrust. He has participated in very large international criminal cartel investigations in many industries and the private litigation that followed. He has also handled the antitrust review of a large number of acquisitions/joint ventures by U.S. and foreign competition authorities. He has also provided antitrust counseling to a large number of companies and several trade associations.
Nominee, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Procedure
Nominee, 2017 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Cross-Border Issues
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Private plaintiffs in U.S. civil litigation seeking damages alleged to have resulted from cartel activities often view the European Commission’s case file as an important source of evidence against cartel participants and seek through U.S. discovery procedures to obtain access to materials in (...)
Today there are more than one-hundred countries with competition law regimes; almost all of them proscribe cartels. The increasing number of agencies has presented increased opportunities for inter-agency cooperation, but the increasing number of enforcement participants has also created ground (...)