European Commission

Penelope Papandropoulos

European Commission
Member of Cabinet, Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager

Dr. Penelope Papandropoulos has been working at the European Commission - DG COMP since 2007. She is currently a member of cabinet for Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager. Previously, she was in the team of the Chief Economist, where she was coordinating the work of the Chief Economist Team in State aid matters. Between 2007 and 2014, she predominantly worked on merger cases, contributing to high profile merger cases such as Google/DoubleClick, Fortis/ABN Amro, Oracle/Sun Microsystems, BHP Billiton / Rio Tinto, Western Digital/Hitachi, Lufthansa/Brussels Airlines, UPS/TNT and many others. In 2014, she worked for a few months as a member of the cabinet of the Commissioner for Competition, Joaquin Almunia, advising predominantly on antitrust and merger cases in the energy and IT sectors. Prior to working at the Commission, Dr Penelope Papandropoulos was for several years an economic consultant at Charles River Associates (CRA International), and previously Lexecon. Dr. Penelope Papandropoulos holds a PhD in Economics from the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

Linked authors

European Commission - DG CNECT (Brussels)
European Commission
European Commission - DG HR (Brussels)
European Commission - DG COMP (Brussels)
DG EMPL (Brussels)


1157 Bulletin

Bertrand Jéhanno, Carl-Christian Buhr, Julia Brockhoff, Penelope Papandropoulos, Peter Eberl, Vera Pozzato The EU Commission clears a merger in the online advertising market applying for the first time the non-horizontal merger guidelines (Google / DoubleClick)


"Google/DoubleClick: The first test for the Commission’s nonhorizontal merger guidelines"* I. Introduction The Google/DoubleClick merger generated considerable interest as it concerned the ubiquitous search engine that most Europeans use in their daily lives. From a competition policy (...)

28885 Review

Penelope Papandropoulos Economic analysis of mergers unilateral effects


The increasing role of economic analysis in competition investigations need not be proven, in particular in the area of mergers, both at the EU and national levels. This paper reviews some recent merger decisions illustrating the latest developments in the use of economic tools, both (...)

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