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Paolo Buccirossi

Lear (Rome)

Director

Paolo Buccirossi has been working in the field of competition policy since 1994. After five years as economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority, he set up Lear (Laboratorio di Economia, Antitrust, Regolamentazione) in 1999, an economic consultancy based in Rome. Since then he has advised private clients and public institutions on a range of competition issues, including cartels, abuses of dominance, vertical agreements and mergers in a variety of industries, before the European Commission and various national competition authorities. he has prepared witness statements in private litigation cases and assisted clients during regulatory reviews, mostly in the telecoms and media sectors. He also cooperated with the Bulgarian and the Lithuanian governments in the implementation of a national competition policy regime and have advised the Dutch and the Czech Competition Authorities on their system of sanctions for breaches of competition law. He has led several research projects for the European Commission, the OFT, the UK Competition Commission and the Brazilian CADE. Mr. Buccirossi has published on several academic journals, including the Journal of Public Economics, the Journal of Industrial Economics and the Journal of Regulatory Economics, and is the editor of the Handbook of Antitrust Economics (MIT Press). He lectures on competition economics in several Italian Universities, including LUISS and Tor Vergata in Rome and the Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca. He holds an MSc in Public Economics and a Ph.D. in Economics awarded from University La Sapienza (Rome, Italy). Paolo was a Visiting Scholar at George Mason University, New York University and Cambridge University.

Distinctions

Nominee, 2022 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Mergers

Nominee, 2021 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Digital

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Linked author

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Lear (Rome)

Italy 1 contribution 9657 visits

Articles

848 Bulletin

Paolo Buccirossi Criminal Sanctions : An overview of EU and national case law

2 July 2020 848

In the 2000s, introducing criminal sanctions, increasing their severity or enlarging the scope for their application were common proposals across jurisdictions to make the fight against cartels more effective. The call for “criminalization” was motivated by the opinion that the existing level and type of sanctions were insufficient to deter cartels. Profit maximizing firms and greedy managers would exploit the lenient treatment they would receive under the prevalent enforcement practice and decide to collude and harm consumers. These suggestions were followed in some jurisdictions. Although Europe has seen both decriminalization and criminalization of its competition laws, an increasing number of EU Member States have introduced criminal sanctions.

9684 Review

Paolo Buccirossi Handbook of Antitrust Economics

September 2008 27

Cette rubrique Livres recense et commente les ouvrages et autres publications en droit de la concurrence, droit & économie de la concurrence et en droit de la régulation. Une telle recension ne peut par nature être exhaustive et se limite donc à présenter quelques publications récentes (...)

Emmanuel Combe, Frederic Jenny, Giancarlo Spagnolo, John M. Connor, Paolo Buccirossi Cartels: Economic efficiency of sanctions

December 2006 9657

Presentation At a time when the Commission is publishing new guidelines on the calculation of fines in antitrust matters, it seems appropriate to question the purpose and effectiveness of the penalties imposed on undertakings that have infringed the competition rules, particularly in the (...)