Miguel de la Mano

Compass Lexecon (Brussels)
Executive Vice President

Miguel de la Mano is an Executive Vice President in Compass Lexecon’s Brussels office. Before joining Compass Lexecon, Dr. de la Mano was Head of Economic Analysis and Evaluation at DG Internal Market. Since 2012, he led a team of experienced financial economists in support of the EU Commission’s unprecedented regulatory overhaul of EU banking, insurance and financial markets. He has co-drafted guidelines setting out the European Commission’s analytical framework on merger control, vertical and horizontal agreements (Article 101) as well as single firm conduct (Article 102). He also co-drafted “guidelines on the submission on economic evidence” for DG COMP and the “new market investigation guidelines” for the former UK Competition Commission. He completed graduate studies in economics at the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, Germany, and the European Institute at Saarbrucken University, Germany. He conducted his Ph.D. research at Oxford University, UK.

Distinctions

Linked authors

OECD - Competition Division (Paris)
DG COMP (Brussels)
Eurocompetition (Brussels)
DG COMP (Brussels)
Compass Lexecon (Brussels)
DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) (Brussels)
DG COMP (Brussels)
DG COMP (Brussels)

Articles

3343 Bulletin

Fabio Polverino, Gregor Langus, Jean-Christophe Mauger, Miguel de la Mano, Patrick D’Souza, Szabolcs Lorincz The European Commission conditionally approves a merger between two Dutch dairy cooperatives (Friesland Foods / Campina)

1229

"Friesland Foods/Campina: a merger between two Dutch dairy cooperatives approved with a set of comprehensive remedies"* I. Introduction The Friesland Foods/Campinacase (M.5046), which concerned a full legal merger between the two leading Dutch dairy producers, covered the entire production (...)

Andrea Amelio, Miguel de la Mano, Pablo Asbo, Ruben Maximiano, Viktor Porubsky The EU Commission conditionally approves a merger in the baking industry after analysis of possible coordinated effects (ABF / GBI)

608

"ABF/GBI Business: coordinated effects baked again"* I. Introduction Just a few months after the Court of Justice gave a key ruling in Sony/BMG v Impala, the Commission adopted its decision in the ABF/GBI Businesscase. This was the first case since Airtoursin which the Commission intervened (...)

Miguel de la Mano, Nicolas Pesaresi, Oliver Stehman The EU Commission prohibits a merger in the airline industry using econometric and survey evidence to assess the non-coordinated effects of the merger (Ryanair / Aer Lingus)

516

"Econometric and survey evidence in the competitive assessment of the Ryanair-Aer Lingus merger"* I. Introduction Recently, the Commission prohibited the hostile takeover by Ryanair of Aer Lingus. The facts of this case differ from previous airline mergers assessed by the European Commission. (...)

Alessandro Paolicchi, Csilla Bartok, Miguel de la Mano, Pierre Lahbabi, Sophie Moonen The EU Commission conditionally approves the acquisition of two subsidiaries of the incumbent oil and gas Hungarian company by a German energy supplier (MOL / E.ON)

990

"A combination of gas release programmes and ownership unbundling as remedy to a problematic energy merger: E.ON / MOL"* 1. Introduction Following an in-depth investigation, on 21 December 2005, the Commission approved under the EU Merger Regulation the acquisition of MOL WMT and MOL Storage, (...)

843 Review

Guillaume Duquesne, Karthik Balisagar, Miguel de la Mano, Renato Nazzini, Thomas P. Brown The implications of bitcoin for competition, antitrust, and regulation in the banking industry

843

This series of articles explores the implications of blockhain for competition in the banking industry. Each of the articles takes a slightly different perspective on the issue. The first explores whether existing antitrust doctrine is suitable for assessing the potential benefits and harms (...)

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