Miguel de la Mano
Compass Lexecon (Brussels)
Executive Vice President
Miguel de la Mano is an Executive Vice President in Compass Lexecon’s Brussels office. Before joining Compass Lexecon, Dr. de la Mano was Head of Economic Analysis and Evaluation at DG Internal Market. Since 2012, he led a team of experienced financial economists in support of the EU Commission’s unprecedented regulatory overhaul of EU banking, insurance and financial markets. He has co-drafted guidelines setting out the European Commission’s analytical framework on merger control, vertical and horizontal agreements (Article 101) as well as single firm conduct (Article 102). He also co-drafted “guidelines on the submission on economic evidence” for DG COMP and the “new market investigation guidelines” for the former UK Competition Commission. He completed graduate studies in economics at the Institute for World Economics in Kiel, Germany, and the European Institute at Saarbrucken University, Germany. He conducted his Ph.D. research at Oxford University, UK.
Distinctions
Linked authors
Ruben Maximiano
OECD - Competition Division (Paris)
Andrea Amelio
DG COMP (Brussels)
Pablo Asbo
Eurocompetition (Brussels)
Viktor Porubsky
DG COMP (Brussels)
Gregor Langus
Compass Lexecon (Brussels)
Patrick D’Souza
DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) (Brussels)
Szabolcs Lorincz
DG COMP (Brussels)
Jean-Christophe Mauger
DG COMP (Brussels)
9638 | Conferences
Articles
3412 Bulletin
1240
"Friesland Foods/Campina: a merger between two Dutch dairy cooperatives approved with a set of comprehensive remedies"* I. Introduction The Friesland Foods/Campinacase (M.5046), which concerned a full legal merger between the two leading Dutch dairy producers, covered the entire production (...)
627
"ABF/GBI Business: coordinated effects baked again"* I. Introduction Just a few months after the Court of Justice gave a key ruling in Sony/BMG v Impala, the Commission adopted its decision in the ABF/GBI Businesscase. This was the first case since Airtoursin which the Commission intervened (...)
527
"Econometric and survey evidence in the competitive assessment of the Ryanair-Aer Lingus merger"* I. Introduction Recently, the Commission prohibited the hostile takeover by Ryanair of Aer Lingus. The facts of this case differ from previous airline mergers assessed by the European Commission. (...)
1018
"A combination of gas release programmes and ownership unbundling as remedy to a problematic energy merger: E.ON / MOL"* 1. Introduction Following an in-depth investigation, on 21 December 2005, the Commission approved under the EU Merger Regulation the acquisition of MOL WMT and MOL Storage, (...)
887 Review
887
This series of articles explores the implications of blockhain for competition in the banking industry. Each of the articles takes a slightly different perspective on the issue. The first explores whether existing antitrust doctrine is suitable for assessing the potential benefits and harms (...)
