


Marcel Boyer
Marcel Boyer (Ph.D. economics, Carnegie-Mellon University) is Emeritus Professor of Economics at the Université de Montréal, Associate Member of the Toulouse School of Economics, Officer of the Order of Canada, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Fellow of CIRANO, Research Fellow of the C.D. Howe Institute, Distinguished Associate Fellow of the Montreal Economic Institute, Honorary Fellow of the Canadian Economics Association, and Honorary Fellow of the French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. Marcel Boyer has acted as expert economic witness on behalf of several national and international public and private corporations and organisations, and has testified as expert witness in labor arbitration cases, cartel cases, litigation cases, copyright cases and more, before various organizations and tribunals such as arbitration tribunals, Copyright Board of Canada, Québec Energy Board, Superior court of Québec (in both civil and criminal cases), Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan, Superior Court of Ontario, Supreme Court of British Columbia.
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Articles
9714 Review
7109
The unexpected shock provoked by the Covid-19 crisis and the measures taken to limit the spread of the pandemic have affected the functioning of many markets. Throughout the world, competition authorities which, in the last decade, had been enforcing their laws in the context of steady economic (...)
636
We discuss various theoretical and empirical hurdles that antitrust authorities and courts must overcome to determine appropriate cartel sanctions, namely regarding the probability of detection, cartel dynamics, cartel duration, and cartel overcharge. I. Introduction 1. Many antitrust (...)
1143
This set of three papers is derived from the conference organized by the Concurrences Journal and the Chambre de commerce internationale of Paris that was held on 17th October 2012 in Paris. In the first article, Emmanuel Combe and Constance Monnier discuss their works of 2007 on the level of (...)
826
The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. Several recent publications have suggested that the recent fines imposed by the European Commission are too low to be dissuasive and should therefore be substantially (...)
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