Luc Gyselen

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Brussels)
Lawyer (Partner)

Mr. Gyselen is partner at Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer (Brussels). His antitrust practice encompasses advice and representation before EU and national agencies on merger control, abusive conduct, cartels, other restrictive practices and state aids. In light of his previous government experience, his expertise is focused in areas where antitrust and regulatory issues are intertwined such as financial services and pharmaceuticals; distribution practices involving manufacturers of fast moving consumer goods such as food; and cartel work including leniency applications. Mr. Gyselen joined the firm in July 2004 after twenty years of public service at various EU institutions. He spent most of his time at the European Commission, where he was a member of the Legal Service in the early years of his career and later held several senior positions in the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP). His career at the Commission was interrupted by a three year secondment to the European Court of Justice where he was a law clerk to the then Belgian judge. During his four years as special assistant to the Director-General in DG COMP (1990-1994), he oversaw the entire range of EU competition policy activities, including the introduction of EC merger control, and acted as liaison officer between DG COMP and the Commissioner in charge of competition policy and his personal staff. Between 1994 and 2004, he played a key role in many leading antitrust cases. In the area of abusive conduct, these included Coca Cola (rebates, exclusive dealing, category management) - a case which led him to write an comprehensive article on rebates that received high visibility in the business community. Mr. Gyselen was also case manager in a dozen cartel cases in the financial services, food and agricultural sectors. In the pharmaceutical area, he cleared a number of joint ventures on the basis of a reasoning that was later incorporated in the Commission’s guidelines on horizontal restraints.

Linked authors

University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
University College London
Vogel & Vogel (Paris)
Ashurst (Paris)
University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Paris)
University Paris II Panthéon‑Assas
ESSEC Business School (Cergy)

Articles

516 Bulletin

25012 Review

David Sevy, Frédéric Jenny, Jérôme Philippe, John Kallaugher, Kay Parplies, Laurence Idot, Luc Gyselen Anticompetitive foreclosure and the coherence of competition policy towards vertical restraints

6608

Recent case law of the European Courts, the recent guidelines of the European Commission on non-horizontal mergers, the decisional practice of the European Commission as well as that of various national competition authorities and courts seem to focus on the possible anticompetitive foreclosure (...)

Books

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