University Professor Joshua D. Wright is the Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute and holds a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. On January 1, 2013, the U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed Professor Wright as a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), following his nomination by President Obama to that position. He rejoined Scalia Law School as a full-time member of the faculty in Fall 2015. Professor Wright is a leading scholar in antitrust law, economics, intellectual property, and consumer protection, and has published more than 100 articles and book chapters, co-authored a leading antitrust casebook, and edited several book volumes focusing on these issues. Professor Wright also served on the editorial board of the Supreme Court Economic Review, the Antitrust Law Journal, and the International Review of Law and Economics. Professor Wright’s teaching and interests include Antitrust, Contracts, Administrative Law, Law and Economics, Intellectual Property and Antitrust, and Quantitative Methods. Professor Wright was awarded the Paul M. Bator Award by the Federalist Society in 2014 to "an academic who demonstrated excellence in legal scholarship, a commitment to teaching, a concern for students, and who has made a significant public impact." Wright previously served the Commission in the Bureau of Competition as its inaugural Scholar-in-Residence from 2007 to 2008, where he focused on enforcement matters and competition policy. Wright’s return to the FTC as a Commissioner marked his fourth stint at the agency, after having served as an intern in both the Bureau of Economics and Bureau of Competition in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Wright received his JD from UCLA in 2002, his PhD in economics from UCLA in 2003, and graduated with honors from the University of California, San Diego in 1998. He is a member of the California and DC Bar.
17084 | Events
Comments of U.S. Federal Trade Commissionner Joshua D. Wright and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s draft updated intellectual property enforcement guidelines* This comment is submitted in response to the Canadian Competition Bureau’s (the Bureau’s) draft stage 2 (...)
This section selects books on themes related to competition laws and economics. This compilation does not attempt to be exhaustive but rather a survey of themes important in the area. The survey usually covers publication over the last three months after publication of the latest issue of (...)
This second roundtable of the conference “New frontiers of Antitrust” (Paris, 21 February 2014) was dedicated to the: “Patents: Can antitrust authorities contribute to fixing the dysfunctional patent system?”. This roundtable acknowledges the fact that there is an increasing number of cases at the (...)
The absence of guidelines identifying the boundaries of the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to prosecute unfair methods of competition under Section 5 has rendered this enforcement tool ineffective in helping the agency fulfill its competition mission. As the Commission approaches its (...)
The Supreme Court ruled in FTC v. Actavis that reverse payment settlement agreements between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies are subject to antitrust scrutiny and should be analyzed under the traditional, but not necessarily full-blown, rule-of-reason. The Court’s decision (...)
The beginning of a shift toward a more regulatory and less litigation-oriented regime of antitrust enforcement was observable by the mid-1990s, if not earlier. The transition toward this more bureaucratic approach by antitrust enforcement agencies is the subject of our analysis. Consent decrees (...)