Douglas H. Ginsburg
Judge Ginsburg is a Professor of Law at George Mason University and a Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals in November 1986 and served as Chief Judge from July 16, 2001 until February 10, 2008. He graduated from Cornell University (B.S. 1970) and from the University of Chicago Law School (J.D. 1973). Following law school, he clerked for Judge Carl McGowan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. From 1975 to 1983, he was a professor at Harvard Law School. He then served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Regulatory Affairs, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from 1983 to 1984; Administrator, Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, from 1984 to 1985; and Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from 1985 to 1986.
Nominee, 2022 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, General Antitrust
Winner, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Intellectual Property
Winner, 2018 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Cross-Border Issues
Nominee, 2017 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Procedure
Nominee, 2016 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Intellectual Property
Nominee, 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, General Antitrust
Nominee, 2013 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, General Antitrust
20205 | Events
As the articles in this special edition demonstrate, criminal antitrust enforcement has been in the news increasingly in recent years. Many of the articles in this special edition concern the prosecution of “hardcore” cartels, the “supreme evil of antitrust.” Other articles discuss anti-cartel reforms across the world. Still others concern new frontiers for criminal enforcement, including monopolistic conduct and cartel conduct in labor markets. Readers will profit from this special edition on a variety of fronts.
We cannot survey all these developments in a brief foreword. Instead, we first provide a global overview of criminal sanctions for cartelists and make the case for enhanced accountability through prison sentences and personal fines. We then examine the possibility, recently raised by the U.S. Department of Justice, of criminally prosecuting unilateral monopolistic conduct.
Comments of U.S. Federal Trade Commissionner Joshua D. Wright and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s draft updated intellectual property enforcement guidelines* This comment is submitted in response to the Canadian Competition Bureau’s (the Bureau’s) draft stage 2 (...)
This section selects books on themes related to competition laws and economics. This compilation does not attempt to be exhaustive but rather a survey of themes important in the area. The survey usually covers publication over the last three months after publication of the latest issue of (...)
Some scholars have argued that the phenomenon known as common ownership, particularly by large investment managers, is anticompetitive and prohibited by the U.S. antitrust laws. These proponents call for the divestiture of trillions of dollars of equities. We believe the argument for antitrust (...)
The panel is devoted to the issue of the geographical scope of competition laws, mainly antitrust law in the public enforcement context. According to the principles of international law, the territoriality principle shall be respected both to determine the jurisdiction to prescribe and the (...)
This foreword is an In Memoriam of Justice Scalia. In his 30 years on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote only three opinions for the Court based directly upon the Sherman Act. In other cases involving antitrust claims, he wrote opinions for the Court resolving the claims based not upon (...)
This second roundtable of the conference “New frontiers of Antitrust” (Paris, 21 February 2014) was dedicated to the: “Patents: Can antitrust authorities contribute to fixing the dysfunctional patent system?”. This roundtable acknowledges the fact that there is an increasing number of cases at the (...)
The beginning of a shift toward a more regulatory and less litigation-oriented regime of antitrust enforcement was observable by the mid-1990s, if not earlier. The transition toward this more bureaucratic approach by antitrust enforcement agencies is the subject of our analysis. Consent decrees (...)