University of Michigan

Daniel A. Crane

University of Michigan

Daniel Crane is the Frederick Paul Furth Sr. Professor of Law. He served as the associate dean for faculty and research from 2013 to 2016. He teaches Contracts, Antitrust, Antitrust and Intellectual Property, and Legislation and Regulation. He previously was a professor of law at Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and a visiting professor at New York University School of Law and the University of Chicago Law School. In spring 2009, he taught antitrust law on a Fulbright Scholarship at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon. Professor Crane’s work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review, the California Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, the Georgetown Law Journal, and the Cornell Law Review, among other journals. He is the author of several books on antitrust law, including Antitrust (Aspen, 2014), The Making of Competition Policy: Legal and Economic Sources (Oxford University Press, 2013), and The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford University Press, 2011).


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University of Michigan
University of Michigan


Daniel Crane
Daniel A. Crane 15 February 2018
Daniel Crane (The University of Michigan Law School)
Daniel A. Crane 5 November 2018 Washington, DC


499 Bulletin

Daniel A. Crane The US Supreme Court rejects antitrust liability for price-squeeze by integrated dominant firms in the telecommunication industry illustrating deep suspicion about the institutional players in the antitrust system (Pacific Bell / linkLine)


linkLine’s Institutional Suspicions In this essay, I review the Supreme Court’s most recent monopolization decision—Pacific Bell v. linkLine—with a focus on the suspicions between the various institutions that had a hand in the case. I. The linkLine Decision The linkLine decision continues the (...)

9372 Review

Frédéric Jenny, Christian Ahlborn, Jeremy Bacharach, Christoph Barth, Christian Bovet, Marcel Boyer, Jacques Buhart, Maria Pilar Canedo Arrillaga, Michèle Carpagnano, Daniel A. Crane, Aymeric De Moncuit, Valentine Delaloye, Jacques Derenne, David-Julien dos Santos Goncalves, David Gabathuler, Mark Griffiths, Leigh Hancher, David Henry, Pierre Horna, David Kupka, Siún O’Keeffe, Christian Ritz, Giulio Cesare Rizza, Matthias Schlau, Mario Siragusa, Anastasia Usova, Faustine Viala, Masako Wakui Competition law and health crisis


The unexpected shock provoked by the Covid-19 crisis and the measures taken to limit the spread of the pandemic have affected the functioning of many markets. Throughout the world, competition authorities which, in the last decade, had been enforcing their laws in the context of steady economic (...)

Daniel A. Crane Legal rules for predatory innovation


Predatory innovation theories claim that firms sometimes obtain or retain dominance by modifying products or introducing new technologies to foreclose rivals. U.S. antitrust law has permitted such claims in some circumstances, but subject to skepticism that courts or agencies are capable of (...)


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