Contact

Damien Neven

The Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies (Geneva), Compass Lexecon (Geneva)

Professor, Senior Consultant

Damien Neven is a Senior Consultant with Compass Lexecon and the Professor of Economics at The Graduate Institute, Geneva. He is a distinguished academic economist with a record of publications in applied industrial organization and competition policy. Previously, Mr. Neven was the Chief Economist at DG Competition where he led the expansion of the Chief Economist Team over just four years from around 10 to nearly 30 highly trained economists, playing a role in all major matters. He provided direct advice to the Competition Commissioner and was closely involved in a number of key developments, both in terms of policy and case assessment. These included the adoption of the Guidelines for the Assessment of Non Horizontal Mergers, with related landmark cases like TomTom/Tele Atlas and Google/DoubleClick; the Guidance Paper on the Priorities for the Enforcement of Article 102, with related cases like Intel and Velux; and the development of quantitative methods of investigation, in particular for horizontal mergers that have found extensive application in cases such as Aer Lingus/Ryanair, Friesland/Campina, Statoil/Conoco, and Unilever/Sara Lee. He also promoted the adoption of the Guidelines on the Submission and Evaluation of Economic Evidence, which sets a framework and standards for the development of economic analysis in all cases. He oversaw the economic analysis of other high-profile or significant cases such as Oracle/Sun, BHP Billiton/Rio Tinto, Mastercard, Visa, and Olympic/Aegean. Prior to his tenure as Chief Economist, he advised parties on major cases such as Airtours/First Choice, Volvo/Scania,and Tetra Laval/Sidel.

Distinctions

Winner, 2021 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Economics

Nominee, 2021 Antitrust Writing Awards: Academic, Unilateral Conduct

Winner, 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards: Business, Mergers

Contact

Linked authors

Luis Agosti

Compass Lexecon (Madrid)

Spain 4 contributions 22083 visits

Enrique Andreu

Compass Lexecon (Brussels)

Belgium 1 contribution 2973 visits

Jonathan B. Baker

American University’s Washington College of Law (Washington)

United States 4 contributions 10198 visits

Dennis Beling

Compass Lexecon (Hong Kong)

Singapore 4 contributions 7605 visits

Thomas Bowman

Compass Lexecon (London)

United Kingdom 1 contribution 1072 visits

19797 | Events

19 Feb 2020 London 1st International Mergers Conference See documents

5 Nov 2018 Washington, DC An Antitrust Professor on the Bench - Judge Douglas Ginsburg Liber Amicorum Conference See documents

26 Jun 2017 Paris New Frontiers of Antitrust 2017 See documents

27 Oct 2016 Bruxelles Intel: Analysing the Advocate General’s Opinion See documents

15 Jul 2014 Bruxelles Competition Policy and National Champions See documents

10 Feb 2012 Paris New Frontiers of antitrust 2012 See documents

Videos

Damien Neven (The Graduate Institute - Compass Lexecon) — Damien Neven 19 February 2020 London

Articles

739 Bulletin

Petros C. Mavroidis, Damien Neven The EU Court of Justice AG Rantos argues that a football federation’s exclusion of a rival football competition is not a restriction by object and is necessary to protect the European Sport Model (ESLC / UEFA / FIFA)

15 December 2022 109

Abstract The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was requested to consider whether the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), which (according to the Court) has “conferred on itself the exclusive power to organize pan-European competitions” between football clubs, could (...)

Damien Neven, Jorge Padilla The EU Court of Justice reverses the General Court’s decision in an abuse of dominance case against a Big Tech company in the market for processors and rules that rebates should be judged under the rule of reason (Intel)

6 September 2017 362

Roundtable Discussion on the ECJ ruling in Intel* On 6 September 2017, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) issued a landmark judgment where it set aside the judgment of the General Court (“GC”) in the highly debated Intel matter. This judgment is of particular significance because it (...)

Damien Neven, Hans Zenger, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the bargaining power of the new entity (Universal Music Group / EMI Music)

21 September 2012 268

This article has been nominated for the 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music (...)

12707 Review

Frederic Jenny, Damien Neven, Jacques Buhart, David Henry, Thomas Funke, Mathew Heim, Catarina Midões, Nicholas Levy, David Little, Henry Mostyn, Ioannis Lianos, Massimo Motta, Martin Peitz, Cristoforo Osti, Almos Papp, Christian Wik, Kristian Hugmark, Julia Vahvaselkä, Antoine Winckler, Thierry Boillot Which competition and industrial policies for the new EU Commission after Siemens/Alstom?

May 2019 7246

This series of articles presents different points of view about the priorities of the newly established Commission on competition policy in Europe in the aftermath of the decision prohibiting the Siemens/Alstom merger and of the manifesto published by French and German governments. These (...)

Damien Neven, Gregor Langus, Vilen Lipatov Standards of proofs in sequential merger control procedures

September 2018 567

We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a first phase of investigation. We find that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the first phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the (...)

Damien Neven State aid control and tax rulings. Is there really a competition issue? (New Frontiers of Antitrust - Paris, 26 June 2017)

November 2017 783

This article argues that there is no presumption that tax rulings distort competition between firms. Rather, tax rulings should be considered, in the same way as subsidy races, as detrimental to the achievement in the internal market. Finally, we argue that the in the presence of complex (...)

Cristina Caffarra, Damien Neven, David Sevy, Laurence Idot, Marixenia Davilla, Miguel Rato, Paul Lugard Intel: The long awaited ECJ ruling

February 2018 1714

It was questionable whether this important judgment would close the debate on the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. Will it put an end to the controversial and even polemical topics related to the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU and in particular to the debate on the effects-based (...)

Damien Neven, Nicolas Petit, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Sandra Marco Colino Intel: Analysing the Advocate General’s opinion

February 2017 1295

The 2009 decision of the EU Commission imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel, and the subsequent judgment of the General Court (GC) upholding the decision have sparked an intense debate as to the way Article 102 TFEU should be applied. This On-Topic adds to the fervent discussion with (...)

Antoine Winckler, Damien Neven, François-Charles Laprévote European champions and merger control rules

December 2014 1102

This set of two papers is derived from the training session on “Competition Policy and National Champions” organized by Concurrences Journal in Brussels the 15th July 2014. In the first paper, Damien Neven (professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of Geneva) argues that a change in (...)