Constance Monnier-Schlumberger
University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Associate Professor
Constance Monnier-Schlumberger is an Associate Professor at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne where she teaches competition policy and economics. She also teached at the French Business School ESCP Europe. Prior to her Economics Ph.D, she studied Political Sciences at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), economics at the Univeristy Paris 1 and at the University of Birmingham (U.K), as well as European law at the Univeristy of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Since 2013, she serves as Non-Governmental Advisor to the International Competition Network. In this capacity, she has been taking part in the activities of the International Competition Network regarding cartels and abuses of dominant positions. Constance Monnier-Schlumberger’s publications deal with competition economics and policy, with a focus on cartels.
Linked authors
Martine Behar-Touchais
University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Bernard Bouloc
University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Béatrice Boulu-Reshef
University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Stéphane Brena
University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Emmanuel Combe
University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
3871 | Events
Articles
35647 Review
1615
This On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law infringements. It reviews the tools available to prevent these violations, in particular through compliance programs and individual sanctions. This set brings together contributions from (...)
1358
We introduce the reader to three stylized scenarios often referred to by practitioners when asked about the share of a cartel overcharge that was passed on from direct to indirect suppliers. We show how sensitive such predictions are with respect to many of the underlying assumptions. Even (...)
960
This article proposes an experimental study of the effectiveness of anti-cartel schemes. Cartels result from the decision to engage in anti-competitive price-fixing conspiracies. The experiments compare the propensities to form cartels in monetary sanctions schemes, leniency schemes, compliance (...)
1149
In this article, we combine the classic approach to cartels in terms of economics of crime approach with a corporate governance approach applied to collusion. It leads us to study in particular the motivations of a manager implicated in a price-fixing arrangement and to conduct a cost-benefit (...)
1501
This paper presents a study of the cartels condemned by the French Competition Authority. It provides an analysis of their characteristics in terms of affected markets, organizational features and duration. Moreover, it studies the penalty policy of the French Competition Authority and (...)
1145
This set of three papers is derived from the conference organized by the Concurrences Journal and the Chambre de commerce internationale of Paris that was held on 17th October 2012 in Paris. In the first article, Emmanuel Combe and Constance Monnier discuss their works of 2007 on the level of (...)
2959
This article draws an exhaustive panorama of all the cartels convicted by the European Commission (111 cartels convicted from 1959 to 2009) and depicts the cartel profile in Europe. We analyze our sample comparing our results with those obtained from international and U.S. data. We study (...)
4346
Based on a sample of 64 cartels convicted by the European Commission from 1975 to 2009, we estimate from easily computable microeconomic variables a range of restitution fines, which amount to the illicit gain, and a range of dissuasive fines, which take into account the probability of (...)
5893
In recent years, the fight against cartels, particularly damaging anti-competitive practices, has become the priority of competition authorities in Europe and North America. The eleventh annual conference on Community competition law and policy, organised by the Robert Schuman Centre of the (...)
7488
This paper provides an empirical methodology to determine fines to be imposed on a cartel which is based on easily computable economic variables. Our approach allows to compare, on a case by case basis, the amount of monetary penalties inflicted by antitrust authorities to the illegal profit (...)
7233
Cet article présente la première étude systématique de tous les cartels condamnés par la Commission européenne depuis 1969. Il fournit une analyse de leurs caractéristiques permettant de tracer leur portrait robot - secteurs concernés, nombre de parties à l’accord, évaluation du rôle des associations (...)
Books
Price
€200.00
Perspectives on Antitrust Compliance
Date
2 March 2022
Price
€200.00
