Keystone Strategy (London)

Cristina Caffarra

Keystone Strategy (London)
Partner, Head of Keystone Europe

Dr. Cristina Caffarra is a Partner at Keystone and leads the firm’s joint venture in Europe. There, she heads Keystone’s economic consulting practice in the European markets and works closely on antitrust, competition, and digital regulation issues with clients across the globe. With a focus on the digital economy and high-growth sectors, Dr. Caffarra leverages the firm’s triad of skills across economics, technology, and strategy to address growing demand from clients for interdisciplinary advisement. Dr. Caffarra has over two decades experience in competition economics, with a focus on platforms and the digital economy. She has provided expert advice and economic analysis to both companies and government agencies, including several landmark cases before the European Commission and various other courts worldwide. Her experience includes matters for high tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, and many others. Her expertise also extends to merger control, assessment of vertical restraints, finding of dominance, evaluation of abusive conduct, and several other competition and antitrust issues. Dr. Caffarra holds a PhD in Economics from Oxford University. She has worked for research institutions worldwide and sits on the Editorial Board of the European Competition Law Journal as well as on the Advisory Board of the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (OUP). She also lectures in competition economics as an Honorary Professor at UCL and has published articles for competition journals as well as presented papers on the economics of competition law at numerous international and academic conferences.

Distinctions

59608 | Events

Videos

US antitrust takes big steps: How to read that in Europe?
Cristina Caffarra 28 October 2020 Webinar
Consumers' "Decision-Making Sovereignty”: Challenging Business Models in the Data Economy (after Facebook)
Cristina Caffarra 8 July 2020 Webinar

Articles

6856 Bulletin

Cristina Caffarra Google Shopping: a shot in the arm for the EC’s enforcement effort, but how much will it matter?

3119

The judgment issued by the EU General Court (“the Court”) on 10 November 2021, dismissing Google’s appeal of the EC’s 2017 decision Google Search (Shopping) (Case AT.39740), is a milestone and a lifeline for DG Competition. Without this endorsement, the whole edifice of Art 102 enforcement (the key European unilateral conduct tool) in the digital space would have been critically undermined. The Court clarifies and even strengthens some of the reasoning in the EC decision, but more importantly it hands the EC a major political victory, appearing to vindicate its approach and record at a time when questions have been raised globally about what has really been achieved by Europe’s antitrust exertions.

Cristina Caffarra, Fiona M. Scott-Morton The EU Commission issues the proposed Digital Markets Act aimed to complement antitrust intervention in digital markets with ex-ante regulation in the form of a set of obligations that platforms identified as “gatekeepers” should abide by

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The European Commission Digital Markets Act: A translation* The European Commission has finally issued the proposed Digital Markets Act, its bid to complement antitrust intervention in digital markets with ex-ante regulation in the form of a set of obligations that platforms identified as (...)

Cristina Caffarra “Follow the Money” - Mapping issues with digital platforms into actionable theories of harm

2396

The paper argues that antitrust tool should be seriously dialled up and can play a major role in the digital space if we are willing to evolve the economic (and legal) thinking on theories of harm in a way that – remaining consistent with key consumer welfare principles – is not just bound by the usual caution (“chilling innovation”) and the obsession with some “precedent” (“where is the tie?"). Unprecedented phenomena require unprecedented thinking.

Cristina Caffarra, Jenny Haydock, Matthew Bennett, Oliver Latham The UK Office of Fair Trading takes the view that bilateral communications of retail prices between manufacturer and retailers are problematic (Sports Bras)

121

When do retail price communications between retailers and manufacturers become RPM?* Introduction Commercial negotiations between manufacturers and retailers necessarily involve a discussion of wholesale prices, but they may also involve a discussion of potential retail prices, including (...)

4127 Review

Books

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