RBB Economics (Brussels)

Benoît Durand

RBB Economics (Brussels)

Benoît Durand is a partner at RBB Economics, which he joined in 2008. He has over 20 years of experience in competition economics, particularly in applying quantitative techniques in the context of competition law investigations. Prior to joining RBB, he was director of economic analysis at the UK’s Competition Commission, and a member of the Chief Economist Office at the Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission. He was previously based in Washington DC, USA, where he worked in private practice. He speaks regularly at competition policy conferences and has published numerous articles on competition economics issues. He teaches competition economics at the Brussels School of Competition and at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, as well as a course on quantitative techniques. Benoît Durand received his Ph.D. in economics from Boston College, USA.


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Benoît Durand (RBB Economics)
Benoît Durand 4 April 2018 Paris
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Benoît Durand
Benoît Durand 22 June 2017 Paris


2293 Bulletin

Benoît Durand The German Competition Authority gets confirmation by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf to halves the fines to the cement cartel based on the result of an independent economic analysis (Cement Cartel)


In 2001, the Bundeskartellamt conducted a series of dawn raids and discovered the existence of a cartel in the cement industry in Germany. Cement producers had divided the market, reaching agreements on sales quotas. This cartel had been operating at least since the beginning of the 1990s. (...)

Benoît Durand, Valérie Rabassa The European Commission receives a notification for the proposed acquisition of a producer in the acetyls and plastic business by a U.S. private merchant-banking company addressing the issue of the role of quantitative analysis to delineate antitrust markets (Blackstone/Acetex)


"The role of quantitative analysis to delineate antitrust markets: An example. Blackstone / Acetex"* Introduction On 20 January 2005, the Commission received a notification for the proposed acquisition of Acetex, an active producer in the acetyls and plastic business, by Blackstone, a U.S. (...)

Benoît Durand, François-Xavier Rouxel, Guillaume Loriot The EU Commission approves, subject to remedies, a merger in the medical devices market giving a practical example of the use of quantitative analyses in merger control (GE Medical Systems / Instrumentarium)


"GE/Instrumentarium: a practical example of the use of quantitative analyses in merger control"* On 2 September 2003, the European Commission approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by General Electric Medical Systems (‘GE’) of the Finnish firm Instrumentarium. The Commission was (...)

15804 Review

Benoît Durand Merger simulation is back: Should we worry about it?


In recent decisions involving fast-moving consumer goods, the European Commission has relied on merger simulation models to predict the likely effect of horizontal mergers. Is this the beginning of a new trend? The merger simulation label contains a variety of models, and if all merger (...)

Benoît Durand Two-sided markets: Yin and Yang, a review of recent UK mergers


Economic literature is warning us that applying a one-sided market logic in two sided markets is bound to generate some errors when assessing the extent of competition between firms. This article reviews some recent UK merger decisions in two-sided market industries and found that in all (...)

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