Antoine Chapsal specializes in empirical and theoretical industrial organization. He has provided economic expertise in a large number of high-profile cases involving mergers, abuses of dominant positions, cartels, information exchanges, regulation, and damage quantification. Recent examples include the Lafarge/Holcim and Fnac/Darty mergers, as well as airfreight, cathode ray tube, and elevator cartel cases. Antoine Chapsal has also assisted various firms in designing optimized pricing strategies and contracts that comply with competition rules. Previously, he worked at the French Ministry of Economy, where he took part in the drafting of the horizontal merger guidelines, and in an American competition economics consultancy where he contributed to the analysis of major antitrust and merger cases. He regularly publishes articles on competition economics, on subjects ranging from the econometric analysis of cartels to geographic market delineation and exclusionary strategies. He is an affiliated professor at the Sciences Po department of economics and a member of the CESifo academic research network.
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Over the last few decades, business practices have evolved at an astonishingly fast pace. Products have become more sophisticated, pricing and contracting strategies have become more complex, and management tools have developed. Competition enforcement authorities have had to adapt to these changes.
The French Competition Authority (FCA) fined 13 luxury perfume companies and 3 national distribution chains for entering into vertical price fixing agreements. The fines total 46.2 million Euros. The French Competition Authority stated that the existence of an anticompetitive conduct was (...)
A conversation with Antoine Chapsal, Partner, Analysis Group, Paris and Brussels. Antoine Chapsal: Allow me to interrupt your discussions for a moment to thank you once again for coming in such large numbers this evening. I would like to thank the Minister in particular for accepting our (...)
In this On-Topic we explore a number of competition issues that arise at the intersection of online and offline retail distribution. We first provide a brief overview of the effects of online distribution and the associated potential challenges for competition policy. In the first paper, we (...)
The papers gathered in this section illustrate the new sanctions policy of the French Competition Authority, following the release of draft guidelines on 17th January 2011. In her contribution, Me Jalabert Doury focuses on the mechanisms proposed in the draft guidelines. Professor Emmanuelle (...)
The method usually applied to compute local market shares is severely flawed. Once the relevant geographic market has been defined, it consists in computing the ratio between the total value of sales by all plants or stores of the firm located in the relevant market over the total value of (...)
The European Commission and the National Competition Authorities commonly based their quantitative analyses on samples, rather than comprehensive datasets. To collect all the information regarding a given “population” (e.g., a series of prices) is costly and time consuming, if not impossible. (...)
Cartel econometrics has become a well-developed field of research that can contribute to the efficient implementation of competition policy. Beyond the most traditional type of analysis aiming to quantify the impact of cartels on consumer welfare, other methods have been developed lately. They (...)