Pay-for-delay agreements are agreements entered into in the pharmaceutical sector. Designed by originator companies, they have the object or effect of delaying the entry of generic competitors on the market. These agreements originated in the United States in the late 1990s and continue to generate numerous legal problems. Despite more than two decades of litigation, the pay-for-delay agreements are still met with great scepticism across the Atlantic and do not benefit from a clear legal regime. The difficulty lies in the fact that these agreements crystallise both competition law and patent law problems. For its part, the European Union has recently been affected by this practice. The European Commission has so far taken up three cases. In each case, the Commission has concluded that the agreements restrict competition because of their object. The Brussels institution has thus shown great intransigence and astonishing severity given its limited experience on the subject. This research work aims to respond to the problems posed by deferred entry agreements by mobilising a comparative approach.
Foreword by Laurence Idot Preface by David Bosco Table of Contents