Concurrences Review in partnership with the Global Antitrust Institute of the Law & Economics Center held the Global Antitrust Economics Conference at George Mason University School of Law on May 29,2015. The conference featured a keynote speech from Maureen Ohlhausen, Commissioner of the US Federal Trade Commission, and five panels of prominent speakers that engaged in a heated debate about the different aspects of Antitrust Law and Economics.
This book presents contributions on five current issues in Antitrust and Law & Economics:
• Use and abuse of economic evidence in antitrust cases
• Market definition v. Market power: Can they be reconciled?
• Coordination issues: Information exchange and price signaling
• Negotiating settlements & remedies: Do you really need to consent?
• Corporate liability & individual liability: Double-paying?
Specifically, in this book, 13 prominent authors offer 11 contributions that tackle some of the most stimulating topics debated during this one-day event in Global Antitrust Economics. Pierre-Yves Cremieux and Aaron Yeater, while they underline that convergence in antitrust economics is recent and remarkable, they also point out the still existing conflicts in economic evidence presented by competition experts; John Harkrider explains his point of view according to which the US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice are both law enforcers and regulators, enforcing laws that are regulatory in nature, relying more on economists than eyewitnesses, reacting more to what may happen, than what has already occurred; Keith Hylton discusses why monetary fines, to be a more effective deterrent threat, should focus on the firm rather than on its agents; Francine Lafontaine offers an analysis of the use of economics in support of the competition mission at the US Federal Trade Commission; Carlos Mena-Labarthe discusses the Mexican experience to show how remedies and their negotiation are valuable tools for emerging competition authorities; Maureen Ohlhausen tackles the problem of competitor control over market entry; William Page tries to identify those signals that solicit cooperation to achieve noncompetitive equilibria, thus bringing about agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act; Dan Rubinfeld explains why, in his point of view, our current systems of private and public enforcement can be improved if more attention is given toward increasing individual incentives; Loren Smith and Maria Stoyadinova highlight the prominence of market definition in antitrust evaluation and litigation; Gregory Werden addresses the concept of the relevant market by highlighting that it is a device for separating active competitive forces that directly and immediately affect economic performance (e.g. prices) from forces that are passive or have indirect, delayed, or highly uncertain effects on economic performance; finally, Lawrence White shows why the US Merger Guidelines and its guidance on market definition continue to provide a robust and powerful analytical framework for defining markets for the purpose of merger analysis.
