La faute lucrative en droit de la concurrence

Godefroy de Moncuit de Boiscuillé

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The study seeks to demonstrate why economic agents have an incentive to infringe competition law. The choice of infringement depends on the benefit derived from the infringement compared to the cost incurred. The notion of "lucrative infringement" perfectly illustrates the expectation of a profit from breaching the law.

In short, Godefroy de Moncuit proposes the construction of a phased deterrent regime aimed at strengthening both the effectiveness and efficiency of the competition rules. Considering that the economic agent makes predictions about the applicable law, it is necessary not only to ensure that competition law is effectively applied, i.e. that the infringer is faced with the costs of his infringement, but also that it is effective, which means that the cost of the infringement must be greater than its possible benefit.

The book was awarded the Concurrences’ PhD Awards as well as by the LIDC’s Jacques Lassier prize.



Read the foreword by Laurence Idot
Read Muriel Chagny’s preface
See Table of Contents

ISBN: 979-10-94201-29-9

Price: 65€ ; 75$ ; 60£.

phd

Author

Publisher Concurrences

Date 15 September 2020

Number of pages 898

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