Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University (Fairfax)
Professor

Joshua D. Wright is a Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law and holds a courtesy appointment in the Department of Economics. From 2013 to 2015, he was one of the five Commissioners of the US Federal Trade Commission. Professor Wright was appointed in 2007 as the inaugural Scholar in Residence at the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition, where he served until Fall 2008. Professor Wright was a Visiting Professor at the University of Texas School of Law and was a Visiting Fellow at the Searle Center at the Northwestern University School of Law during the 2008-09 academic year. He also regularly lectures on economics, empirical methods, and antitrust economics to state and federal judges through the George Mason University Law and Economics Center Judicial Education Program. He received both a J.D. and a Ph.D. in economics from UCLA, where he was managing editor of the UCLA Law Review, and a B.A. in economics with highest departmental honors at the University of California, San Diego. Before coming to George Mason University School of Law, Professor Wright clerked for the Honorable James V. Selna of the Central District of California and taught at the Pepperdine University Graduate School of Public Policy. Professor Wright’s areas of expertise include antitrust law and economics, consumer protection, empirical law and economics, intellectual property and the law and economics of contracts.

Distinctions

Auteurs associés

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Washington DC)
University Paris II Panthéon‑Assas
French State Council (Paris)
ESSEC Business School (Cergy)
Italian Senate
British Competition Authority - CMA (London)
UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (London)
European Commission

Vidéos

Joshua Wright - US Federal Trade Commission
Joshua D. Wright 29 mai 2015 Washington, DC

Articles

134 Bulletin

1708 Revue

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Frédéric Jenny, Joshua D. Wright, Thomas Graf Brevets : Les autorités de concurrence sont-elles en mesure de corriger les dysfonctionnements du système ? (New Frontiers of Antitrust, Paris, 21 février 2014)

528

La deuxième table-ronde de la conférence “Demain la concurrence” du 21 février 2014 à Paris, était dédiée aux “Brevets : Les autorités de concurrences sont-elles en mesure de corriger les dysfonctionnements du système ?”. Cette table ronde qui part du constat de l’accroissement significatif des affaires qui (...)

Joshua D. Wright FTC v. Actavis and the future of reverse payment cases

272

The Supreme Court ruled in FTC v. Actavis that reverse payment settlement agreements between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies are subject to antitrust scrutiny and should be analyzed under the traditional, but not necessarily full-blown, rule-of-reason. The Court’s decision (...)

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Joshua D. Wright Antitrust settlements : The culture of consent

455

L’évolution vers un régime antitrust plus réglementaire et moins axé sur le contentieu a débuté vers le milieu des années 1990, voir avant. Les auteurs du présent article analysent la transition vers cette approche plus bureaucratique des agences antitrust. Les "consent decrees" permettent aux autorités (...)

Livres

Envoyer un message