CONFERENCE: CHINA - MERGER CONTROL - NOTIFICATION - INVESTIGATIONS - FRAND - REMEDIES - COMMITMENTS - INCOMPLIANCE RISK

Merger control (10 years of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China - Beijing, 14 July 2018)

These papers review the use of FRAND commitment as merger remedy and the risks of Un-notified Concentrations in China. The paper looks at the economic meaning of FRAND price after the merger, the potential abuse of FRAND commitment and the implication of these remedies. By the end of this October, the antitrust authority has investigated and published 27 Un-notified Concentrations. It is not difficult to see that the incompliance risk in concentration of undertakings become increasingly serious. This article is aimed to assist companies to understand and manage the risk of Un-notified Concentration by listing out the procedure and timeline of investigations against Un-notified Concentration, setting forth a preliminary observations thereof as well as giving some practical suggestions.

FRAND commitment as merger remedy in China Wei Tan Managing Director, Mingde Economic Research Inc., Washington, D.C I. Introduction 1. In recent years, Chinese antitrust authority has frequently used fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitment as a part of merger remedy. For example, Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued seven decisions in 2017 and three decisions included FRAND commitment from the merging parties. [1] In addition, the FRAND commitment imposed on the merging parties is not limited to intellectual property (IP) licensing practice, but also includes commitment of merging parties to set post-merger prices on FRAND terms. Other major antitrust jurisdictions have not imposed similar FRAND conditions on the merging parties for the same transactions. FRAND

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Authors

  • Mingde Economic Research (Washington DC)
  • Lifang (Beijing)
  • Lifang (Beijing)

Quotation

Wei Tan, Shan Jiao, Ying Qin, Merger control (10 years of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China - Beijing, 14 July 2018), November 2018, Concurrences Review N° 4-2018, Art. N° 88350, www.concurrences.com

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