CONFERENCES: SOCIETY - DEMOCRACY - ONLINE MARKETS - OFFLINE WELFARE EFFECTS - ALGORITHMS

Policy and enforcement choices (Online markets and offline welfare effects: The Internet, competition, society and democracy - Oxford, 22 May 2017)

Algorithms are not just important in our modern society, but they also have major impacts in competition enforcement, notably in regard to the algorithmic pricing. Pricing algorithms raise three issues from a competition perspective: They may increase the effectiveness of overt collusion, facilitate coordinated interaction in the absence of a traditional “agreement” between competitors and enable price discrimination strategies that lead to higher prices for certain groups of customers.

Algorithms and coordinated effects Terrell McSweeny [1] Commissioner, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 1. Good afternoon, everyone. I am happy to be here with you today at the University of Oxford. I would like to thank the Centre for Competition Law and Policy for organizing this event. I am going to talk today about the rise of algorithmic pricing and its implications for competition enforcement. 2. First of all, I think it is important to step back and recognize just how important algorithms are in modern society. Every email we send relies on algorithms to get where it needs to go. Every Internet search we run relies on algorithms to provide us with relevant results. Every app on a smartphone is a bundle of computer code, or in other words, an algorithm. Without

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  • US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Washington)

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Terrell McSweeny, Policy and enforcement choices (Online markets and offline welfare effects: The Internet, competition, society and democracy - Oxford, 22 May 2017), September 2017, Concurrences Review N° 3-2017, Art. N° 84706, www.concurrences.com

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