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See version in english The antitrust economics of bidding markets

DROIT ET ECONOMIE : MARCHES D’APPELS D’OFFRES - CARACTERISTIQUES - ANALYSES SPECIFIQUES - DONNEES RELATIVES AUX APPELS D’OFFRES PASSES - APPRECIATION DES EFFETS NON-COORDONNES ET COORDONNES DES FUSIONS HORIZONTALES

The antitrust economics of bidding markets

La notion de marchés d’appels d’offres recouvre une grande variété de situations et ne justifie aucune présomption générale, favorable ou défavorable, pour la mise en oeuvre de la politique de la concurrence. Mais leurs caractéristiques appellent des analyses spécifiques. En particulier, l’étude de données relatives aux appels d’offres passés peut contribuer à l’appréciation des effets non-coordonnés et coordonnés des fusions horizontales.

1. In many markets, the textbook model of suppliers quoting prices and bringing their offering to the market fails to apply. Instead, competition takes place on a customer-by-customer basis, resulting into different prices and, possibly, different product characteristics for different customers. The recent advent of internet sourcing and electronic procurement auctions has increased the prevalence of this type of market functioning. Economists and competition authorities usually label these markets as bidding markets, even though the exact definition is less than clear-cut (see below). The European Commission has recently acknowledged the bidding-market nature of several markets affected by recent mergers, and correspondingly undertaken specific types of economic exercises, chiefly

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David Spector, The antitrust economics of bidding markets, May 2007, Concurrences Review N° 2-2007, Art. N° 13585, pp. 23-28

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