The Global Antitrust Economics Conference

The 2nd edition of the Global Antitrust Economics Conference was organized by Concurrences Review together with the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, with the support of Analysis Group (Economic Consulting & Strategy), Axinn, The Brattle Group, Compass Lexecon, Cornerstone Research, Dechert LLP, Navigant, Orrick, White & Case and Parr Global (Media Sponsor).

International mergers: Working across multiple jurisdictions

The control of transnational mergers and international cooperation procedures: The Brazilian experience

Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo Commissioner, CADE, Brasilia Professor, BrasiliaSchool of Law / IDP

I. Introduction

1. The process of economic globalization has entailed a rapid increase in worldwide mergers and acquisitions over the last decades. Although this type of international transaction evidences economic expansion, it also raises several competition concerns, such as the multiple effects of these transactions on different international jurisdictions. Such multiple effects may require different assessments from each antitrust authority. Consequently, different decisions arise and there may be contradictory rulings with various remedies and results, which, apart from not addressing competition concerns properly, might often threaten the transaction in question.

2. When consulting the specialized literature regarding the subject, we may evidence attempts to provide a general and standardized solution to this matter. However, what is noted is the operational unfeasibility of all these standardized solutions. The proposal of a leader jurisdiction (either mandatory or optional) is based on certain preemptive measures for the jurisdiction that is likely to be more affected by the transaction. This model finds obstacles for its implementation, which range from the choice of the jurisdiction that would be the more affected to the requirement of international agreements that define who would choose the leader jurisdiction. The proposal of a unified jurisdiction based on specific rules applied to all jurisdictions may reduce transaction costs and the risk of contradictory decisions, but national sovereignty considerations may render this solution unfeasible.

© Photos Jasmin Shah

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  • Analysis Group (Chicago)
  • US Department of Justice (San Francisco)
  • Loyola University Chicago School of Law
  • Microsoft (Redmond)
  • United State District Court (New York)
  • Plastiq (London)
  • White & Case (Brussels)
  • Axinn Veltrop & Harkrider (New York)
  • The Brattle Group (Washington)
  • Navigant
  • US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Washington DC)
  • University of Chicago - Law School
  • Maersk (Copenhagen)
  • Brasilian Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) (Brasilia)
  • UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (London)
  • University of Northwestern - Pritzker School of Law (Chicago)
  • Cornerstone Research (San Francisco)
  • Georgetown University
  • Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe (Washington)
  • University of Chicago - Law School
  • US Department of Justice (Washington)
  • Tennessee Attorney General’s Office (Nashville)
  • Boston University - School of Law
  • Seton Hall University
  • Booth School of Business
  • Uber (San Francisco)
  • Greenberg Traurig (New York)
  • University of Northwestern - Kellogg School of Management (Chicago)
  • Dechert (New York)