Daniel Crane

University of Michigan
Professor

Daniel Crane is the associate dean for faculty and research and the Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law. He teaches Contracts, Antitrust, Antitrust and Intellectual Property, and Legislation and Regulation. He was previously professor of law at Yeshiva University’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and a visiting professor at New York University Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. In spring 2009, he taught antitrust law on a Fulbright Scholarship at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon. Dean Crane’s work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review, the California Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, the Georgetown Law Journal, and the Cornell Law Review, among other journals. He is the author of several books on antitrust law, including Antitrust (Aspen, 2014), The Making of Competition Policy: Legal and Economic Sources (Oxford University Press, 2013), and The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Distinctions

Linked authors

New York University
George Mason University (Fairfax)
Seton Hall University
The Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies (Geneva)
Bates White (Washington)
Cornerstone Research (Menlo Park)
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe (Washington)
Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Videos

Daniel Crane (The University of Michigan Law School)
Daniel Crane 5 November 2018 Washington, DC

Articles

257 Bulletin

Daniel Crane The US Supreme Court rejects antitrust liability for price-squeeze by integrated dominant firms in the telecommunication industry illustrating deep suspicion about the institutional players in the antitrust system (Pacific Bell / linkLine)

257

linkLine’s Institutional Suspicions In this essay, I review the Supreme Court’s most recent monopolization decision—Pacific Bell v. linkLine—with a focus on the suspicions between the various institutions that had a hand in the case. I. The linkLine Decision The linkLine decision continues the (...)

1461 Review

Daniel Crane Legal rules for predatory innovation

395

Selon les théories d’éviction basées sur l’innovation, les entreprises obtiendraient ou maintiendraient leur prédominance en modifiant leurs produits ou en introduisant de nouvelles technologies dans le but d’évincer leurs concurrents. La loi américaine sur la concurrence a donné raison à ces (...)

Daniel Crane, Eleanor M. Fox Eleanor Fox, New York University: Networking the world

1066

1. Eleanor, you are a special person in the antitrust field. Around the world, no name is more recognized or respected than yours as an expert on international antitrust. How did you first get interested in antitrust law? 2. When you first started practicing law, there were few women in the (...)

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