Ryan C. Tisch

Crowell & Moring (Washington)
Lawyer (Partner)

Ryan C. Tisch is a partner in Cromwell Moring’s Antitrust Group. His practice focuses on antitrust business counseling, merger control, and government antitrust investigations of both horizontal and vertical conduct. Ryan currently serves as vice-chair of the Trade, Sports, and Professional Associations Committee of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association. Ryan is also active in pro bono matters, with an emphasis on immigration and asylum issues. Ryan graduated from Yale College in 1998 with a B.A. in ethics, politics, and economics. He earned his J.D. with honors from the University of Chicago Law School in 2001. He is a member of the the District of Columbia Bar.

Linked authors

Crowell & Moring (Washington)
Crowell & Moring (Washington)
Crowell & Moring (Washington)
Crowell & Moring (Irvine)
Crowell & Moring (Irvine)
United Airlines

Articles

766 Bulletin

Chahira Solh, Daniel A. SASSE, Robert A. Lipstein, Ryan C. Tisch The Kansas Supreme Court holds that resale price maintenance, whether purely vertical or in a dual distribution setting, is per se illegal and rejects applicability of federal rule of reason analysis to claims brought under Kansas antitrust law (O’Brien / Leegin Creative Leather Products)

145

UPDATE NOTE: On April 16, 2013, the Kansas legislature reversed the decision discussed below, and adopted a "reasonableness" standard for analyzing vertical price agreements. On May 4, 2012, Kansas joined the growing trend among states to limit the distribution flexibility that had been (...)

Mika Clark, Robert A. Lipstein, Ryan C. Tisch The US DOJ demands conduct remedies from two strong competitors in related markets before approving a vertical merger that will allow the combined company to enter into the online travel search market (Google / ITA)

198

U.S. antitrust agencies, in a flurry of recent actions, have reinvigorated vertical merger enforcement, claiming competitive harm from what, in the past, would potentially have been viewed as efficiency-enhancing vertical integration. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”), in particular, has (...)

Mika Clark, Robert A. Lipstein, Ryan C. Tisch The US DoJ conditions approval of a joint venture upon behavioral remedies, such as specific terms of licensing and management of video content, in the industries of online video distribution and video programming (Comcast and NBC Universal)

212

U.S. antitrust agencies, in a flurry of recent actions, have reinvigorated vertical merger enforcement, claiming competitive harm from what, in the past, would potentially have been viewed as efficiency-enhancing vertical integration. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”), in particular, has (...)

Mika Clark, Robert A. Lipstein, Ryan C. Tisch The US DoJ conditions approval of a vertical merger upon the implementation of structural and behavioral remedies to protect the market for primary ticketing services (Ticketmaster / Live Nation)

121

U.S. antitrust agencies, in a flurry of recent actions, have reinvigorated vertical merger enforcement, claiming competitive harm from what, in the past, would potentially have been viewed as efficiency-enhancing vertical integration. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”), in particular, has (...)

Bridget E. Calhoun, Ryan C. Tisch, William Randolph Smith The US FTC modifies a 2000 consent order and sets aside the prohibitions imposed on a manufacturer to set minimum resale prices in contracts with retailers (Nine West Group)

90

Shoe seller Nine West Group Inc. has successfully petitioned the FTC to modify a 2000 consent order in which the company agreed not to undertake agreements with its retailers setting minimum resale prices. The case provides a significant guidepost for U.S. manufacturers who have been searching (...)

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