John Asker

University of California - Los Angeles (UCLA)
Professor

John Asker is a Professor of Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. Prior to joining UCLA, he was an Associate Professor of Economics at New York University Stern School of Business since 2004. He teaches classes in empirical industrial organization, strategy research and microeconomics. His research covers topics related to cartel behavior, vertical restraints, procurement design and the effects of industry subsidies. To address these issues, he employs a mix of theoretical and empirical methods. His papers have been published in journals, including the American Economic Review, the RAND Journal of Economics, the Journal of Public Economics and the Journal of Political Economy. He is currently an Editor of the Journal of Industrial Economics. Professor Asker has held visiting positions at the Centre of the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Melbourne Business School. He is also a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research and an affiliated faculty member of NYU Abu Dhabi. Outside of the academy he has worked as a political advisor, economic consultant and expert witness. Professor Asker holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. from Harvard University and a B.Ec.(Hons) from the Australian National University.

Distinctions

Linked authors

Morgan Lewis (New York)
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Washington DC)
Sullivan & Cromwell (New York)
Morgan Stanley (New York)
J.P. Morgan (Iselin)
Morgan Lewis (Washington)
PNC Bank (Pittsburgh)
Boston University - Questrom School of Business

Articles

7874 Review

John Asker The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings

7874

Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding (...)

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